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The Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971 provided up to $250 million
in guaranteed loans to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. As of December
1976, $100 million of these loans were still outstanding.
This thesis is an investigation of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act,
the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
during the 1971—1976 time frame. Both the legislation and Lockheed's
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the term "government bailout"
have become synonymous to many individuals due to the operation of the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board in guaranteeing loans to a maximum of
$250 million, made possible by the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971.
The debates and hearings which led to the passage of the Emergency
Loan Guarantee Act were both complex and important in the issues raised.
An enormous amount of material was presented by witnesses for and
against the guarantees. Congressional approval came only after con-
siderable controversy and very close votes in both the House and the
Senate.
Five years later there is still considerable debate over the "Lock-
heed loan." Many of the same issues are raised over and over again.
Confusion still exists over the "terms" of the loan guarantee. This
was especially true during discussions on possible aid to New York City
during its fiscal crisis in late 1975.
This thesis is divided into three main parts: (1) A brief descrip-
tion of the hearings and debates leading up to the passage of the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Act. The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board is
described and some of its actions, over the years, highlighted;
(2) Lockheed Aircraft Corporation operations are looked at from the
inception of the loan guarantees through 1976; and (3) conclusions are
drawn based on the author's assessment of the events discussed in parts
(1) and (2) . Some of the more critical predictions, made by "expert"

witnesses concerning what would happen if the government did guarantee
loans to Lockheed are examined.
Originally conceived as a continuation of Lockheed case studies
written by management students at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1974,
this project grew to its present form as research material was gathered
from the many public sources available. Every attempt has been made to
verify important items from more than one source and to look behind the
headlines whenever possible. Complete source information is provided
to aid other students in any subsequent efforts to investigate Lockheed.

II. THE LOCKHEED LOAN
The Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971 was signed into law on
August 9, 1971 following a period of considerable debate and controversy.
Many of the issues reflected the philosophical
,
political and economic
concerns of the Congress. All of them are of interest to those working
in the defense area.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT
The time table for major events leading to the loan guarantee in
1971 is as follows
May 13 The Administration presented the bill to Congress
asking for $250 million in government guaranteed
loans for Lockheed Corporation.
House of Representatives Timetable
May 13 - July 7
House Banking and Currency Committee Staff studies
the Administration's bill.
Staff report presented to committee members recom-
mending rejection of proposed guarantee.
House Banking and Currency Committee hearings.
Committee reports the bill (HR8432) by a vote of
23 to 11.
House roll call vote passes HR8432 (192-189)
.
June 7 — July 9
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee
holds hearings.
July 19 Committee reports the bill (S2308) by a vote of
10 to 5.
July 21-31 Senate floor debate of S2308.
August 2 Senate roll call vote passes S2308 (49-48)
.
August 9 President Nixon signs the bill into law.
The debate was sharp, the questioning tough , and emotions ran high








Democrat, liberal vs. conservative or Nortli-South battle, To many the
Senate appeared in a state of confusion, with Republicans expressing
solicitude for the little men threatened with unemployment and Democrats
preaching about discipline in the market place. The battle lines were
drawn but they were not pure and simple. Various interest groups
exerted enormous pressure [Ref . 1]
.
In the Congress activities were highlighted by:
— Active campaigning by California Senators Alan Cranston and John
Tunney, both liberal Democrats, for the Republican Nixon Adminis-
tration bill.
— Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota) voted for the loan guaran-
tee. He had been subject to severe criticism from organized
labor after his earlier vote against the SST.
— 1971 Presidential hopefuls Senators Birch Bayh (D-Ind) , Fred
Harris (D-Okla)
, George McGovem (D-SD) and Edmund Muskie (D-Me)
all voted against the loan guarantee.
— Senators Stuart Symington (D-Mo) and Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo) in
whose state McDonnell—Douglas is headquartered, voted against the
bill.
— Both Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) and Edward Brook (R—Mass)
voted against the measure. General Electrics aircraft engine
group is located in West Lynn, Massachusetts.
— Both Connecticut Senators Ribicoff (D) and Weicker (R) voted
against the bill. Pratt and Whitney Aircraft is located there.
— Only six of 38 California congressmen voted against the Lockheed
guarantee.
Many Congressmen admitted voting against their true convections.
This was especially true toward the end of the roll when it was apparent
the vote would be close. The final tally even split one family. Senator
Barry Goldwater (R-^Ariz) voted against the bill while his son,
Representative Barry Goldwater, Jr. , voted for it. The younger Goldwater
represents the Burbank, California district where a major portion of




Well-known witnesses at the hearings included [Ref . 3] :
Those supporting ;
Daniel Haughton, Chairman of the Board, Lockheed Corporation.
Chauncey Medberry III, Chairman of the Board, Bank of America
(as well as representatives from other Lockheed banks)
.
John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury.
Arthur Burns, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board.
Fred Hall, Chairman, Eastern Airlines.
Ed White, President, Bowman Instruments (L—1011 subcontractor).
Thomas Kleppe, Administrator, Small Business Association (SBA)
.
Gearge Meany, President, AFL-CIO.
Those against :
Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis)
.
Fred Borch, Chairman of the Board, General Electric.
Leonard Woodcock, President, Aerospace Union (UAW)
.
Ralph Nader, Center for the Study of Responsive Law.
John Galbraith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
Vern Countryman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
Major splits occurred in both labor and industry, among congressmen
and academicians. During the hearings, it became apparent that major
differences within the Administration itself could be found among Defense,
the Treasury and the President's own staff. Filibusters, cloture votes,
name calling and threats of physical violence became commonplace on the
Senate floor [Ref. 4]. (See Appendix A for vote list, House and Senate.)
B. ISSUES RELEVANT TO DOD POLICIES
1. Role of Defense Contractors and the Government
The role of the Federal Government, as it interacts with private
enterprise, was a topic of much discussion. To some the loan guarantee
could spell the beginning of the socialization of the American aircraft
and aerospace industry. To others this socializing process had taken
place many years before. Indeed the very notion of "free enterprise"
was discounted by many witnesses. As Treasury Secretary John Connally
said, "the time has come within the United States when we have to look
12

at things differently. Free enterprise is just not all that free"
[Ref
. 5] . He and others expressed more concern with the national
economy and unemployment. Times were rough, especially in aerospace
during 1971.
A parallel bill would provide up to $500 million in loans to
corporations essential to national defense . But opponents charged
that the American taxpayer would end up paying dearly for excess
capacity. Their claim was that government contracts pick up the tab
for idle equipment [Ref. 6, p. 26422]
.
The very important role of competitive markets came up time
and time again. Proponents would argue that allowing Lockheed to
fail would lessen the competitive aspects of the aerospace industry.
Others argued that one of the functions of a competitive environment
is to screen out inefficient competitors and punish mismanagement.
They described Lockheed operations during the latter 60' s in these
very terms [Ref. 6, p. 26796]
.
The motivation for McDonnell Douglas (DO-10 airframe producer)
and General Electric (DC—10 engine supplier) to oppose the loan was
clear to pro—Lockheed forces. As major competitors, they would attract .
a large amount of Lockheed's business upon bankruptcy [Ref. 7]. For
most DOD officials having Lockheed stay in business would be a definite
advantage.
2. Government Contracting Issues
What would prevent the government from giving Lockheed preferen-
tial treatment in contracts if the guarantee went through? Would it
not be in the government's self interest to see that Lockheed gets some
"sweetheart" contracts while the guarantee is in effect [Ref. 6, p. 26409]?
13

Wouldn't the government have to ease up on its contract administration
policies should Lockheed government contracts get in trouble [Ref. 6,
p. 26797]? Proponents discounted these concerns because (1) directions
of this type would have to come down from higher levels and would make
a mockery of the source selection and contract administration process;
(2) competitors would quickly catch on and seek redress through the bid
protest channels.
A major contention by many Lockheed creditors was that the
government's practice of Total Package Procurement (TPP) had led to
Lockheed's demise. They pointed out that DOD no longer contracted by
this method thus implying something less than satisfaction with the
process. Loan opponents argued that TPP would still be around had it
not been for Lockheed's mishandling and apparent "buy—ins" during the
late 60's [Ref. 6, p. 26811].
When Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Chairman Secor Browne stated
that "the government has traditionally financed commercial aircraft in
this country through the Defense Department where military R&D has been
used as a basis for commercial development" [5] , he directly overlapped
the government and commercial sectors of a business like Lockheed.
This echoed the claim that the government has a direct interest in com-
mercial projects such as the L-1011. When progress payments stop or
slow down, a liquidity squeeze takes place in all areas of the business.
Opponents felt this was the inherent risk in this type of business.
Admiral Rickover's quote that, "We have been generating a new philosophy
where we privatize profits and socialize losses" became a popular slogan
for loan opponents [Ref. 6, p. 26998] . Industry spokesmen thought just




The claim that the U. S. Government pays for subcontracting
mistakes and subcontractor pressuring tactics focused in on the L-1011.
Rolls Royce (the makers of the L-1011 engines) went bankrupt. The
British government would come to its aid only if the U. S. Government
guarantees Lockheed's continued existence. This in turn infuriates G.E.
and Pratt and Whitney who lost out on the original bids. Is the U. S.
Government going to protect foreign jobs? What about Lockheed's reputa-
tion for "sandpapering" its subcontractors so as to get that low bid in?
Isn't this really a form of "buy-in" [7]?
4. Bankruptcy
Major confusion developed throughout the hearings as to what
would happen to government contracts should Lockheed go bankrupt. Secre-
tary Packard felt sure that all government contracts would be completed,
despite bankruptcy, although delays and cost increases would probably
result [2] . But what about major subcontractors of the L—1011 who are
also defense subcontractors? Many claimed that every defense contract
that Lockheed had with others would have to be renegotiated.
Others argued that bankruptcy would actually improve performance
in government contracts. With Lockheed the government was subsidizing
an inefficient and wasteful producer. Transferring these contracts to
others would result in new ideas , new management techniques and better
cost control [Ref. 6, p. 26795]. Major competitors to Lockheed felt
sure they could take over the defense portions of Lockheed's contracts
and would do so with delight. Most of these projects were making a
profit for Lockheed during this time frame.
15

5. Responsible vs. Irresponsible Management
Who was to blame? Was it government contracting under Total
Package Procurement or general mismanagement within Lockheed itself?
Both overoptimistic estimates and the need for follow-on defense work
were cited as reasons for Lockheed's $2 billion "buy in" (C5A) . But
economic conditions, war material shortages and government inflexi-
bility certainly had a major effect. Deputy Secretary Packard stated
that "past procurement policies of the department had sheltered bad
management by encouraging contractors to rely on the government to bail
them out when they made a mistake, or took on a project beyond their
capacity, or grossly underestimated costs" [Ref. 2, p. 155] . As he
saw it both the government and the contractor were at fault. Would
they change?
C. EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE BOARD
The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board was set up with the passage and
signing of Public Law 92-70 in August 1971 (see Appendix B) . Under
this law up to $250 million in guaranteed loans would be made available
to Lockheed from its 24 lending banks (see Exhibit I) as part of an
overall financing plan [Ref. 8]. This credit arrangement provided
funds in amounts up to $650 million. Of this amount, $400 million re-
presented the refinancing of previous loans to Lockheed and $250
million additional funding under the terms of this law. Exhibit II
shows how this guaranteed loan would compare to direct loans and other
guarantees provided by the U. S. Government in fiscal years 1972 and
1973 [Ref. 9].
At its first two meetings the Board considered the application




PARTICIPATING BANKS AND PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION IN THE
1971 CREDIT AGREEMENT
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Source: En-ergency Loan <
Name of Bank
Bank of America National Trust and Savings
Bankers Trust Company
The Chase Manhattan Bank
First National City Bank
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York
Security Pacific National Bank
Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago




The First National Bank of Boston
The First National Bank of Chicago
Irving Trust Company
Wells Fargo Bank National Association
Girard Trust Bank
The Philadelphia National Bank
The Bank of California National Association
The Citizens and Southern National Bank
The First National Bank of Atlanta
Trust Company of Georgia
The Fulton National Bank of Atlanta
The Pacific National Bank of Washington




NEW COMMITMENTS FOR FEDERAL CREDIT PROGRAMS
(in millions of dollars)
1071 actual 1972 oil mate 1973 til. matt
Agency or program
(tiptnJUutt account Guar- Guar Guar-
projiams in ittlici) Direct an- Direct an- Direct en-
loam teed loans teed loana teed
loan* loana loana
Funds appropriated to the President:
International security assistance 688 46 350 200 493 136
International development assistance 718 56 790 111 918 105
Overseas Private Investment Corporation. . 2 9 10 31 25 51
Agriculture.
Rural Electrification Administration.
. 487 662 689 ... .
Farmers Home Administration 463 1.898 286 2.426 II 3.288
Commodity Credit Corporation 421 450 450 ...
Commodity loans.. 1,748 2,580 1.988
Public Law 480 Long-term export credits.. 558 598 705 ....
Commerce:
Economic Development Administration 60 * 63 4 73 6
Maritime Administration ... 281 I 344 439
Trade adjustment assistance 25 50 25 50
Health. Education, and Welfare 51 1.644 101 2.251 151 2.972
Expenditure account loans . 278 339 53
Housing and Urban Development:
Low-rent public housing. 171 1,709 175 1.748 216 2.159
Community development loans 623 1.091 662 2.622 705 800
Federal Housing Administration.... 17 22.629 50 25.377 50 29.247
Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion '....._.. ... 537 293 188 ....
New communities fund.. 50 28 160 28 300
Other mortgage credit 75 263 100 200 100 200
Interior ... . 14 24 27
Transportation. 90 106 57 55 80 109
Veterans Administration:
Housing loans and guarantees 239 4,356 285 7,409 287 7.691
Insurance policy loans . 143 130 .. .. 123
District of Columbia ... . 41 20 143 20 190 70
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board _ 120 30
Export- Import Bank 2 2.362 3.507 319 4.512 4.176
Federal Home Loan Bank Board . 6 .... 19 ... 8
Small Business Administration 572 863 633 1.318 375 1,965
Other agencies and programs 64 20 84 16 45 21
Expenditure account loans _ 24 . . . 48 . . . 55
Total, loan account. 6,437 4.599 3.845
Total, expenditure account 4,014 ... 4.705 ...... 4.212
Grand total 10,451 38.547 9,304 48,983 8,057 53.816
'Less than $0.5 million.
I To avoid douhle counting, eacludes GNMA commitment! for guaranteei of mortgage backed
securities, and for direct purchase* of FMA and VA mortgages under the tandem plan
; Excluded from budget totals by statute on Aug 17. I ''71 . direr I loan commitments excluded from
this table ar- $7.(H3 million in l"72 and $7,400 million .n l"71
Source: Special Analyses Budget of the U. S., Fiscal Year 1973
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John B. Connally (Chairman)
, Secretary of the Treasury; Arthur Burns,
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; and William Casey, Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) . By September 9, 1971,
the Board had committed the government to guarantee loans to Lockheed
up to the full extent of the $250 million limit under the Act and
authorized the first takedown in the amount of $50 million. A further
schedule of loan takedowns is found in Exhibit III [Ref . 10] . The
highest amount of guaranteed borrowing as of December 1976 had been
$245 million. By 1975 Lockheed had asked for and received a two-year
extension on the guarantee arrangement. An additional one-year exten-
sion could also be authorized beyond that date.
1. Loan Collateral
As required by the law, security was pledged by Lockheed in
the form of the entire capital stock of the following major wholly-
owned subsidiaries:
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.
Lockheed Electronics Company, Inc.
Lockheed Properties, Inc.
Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction Company
Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation
To this pool was added (1) most of the remaining unpledged improved
real estate owned by Lockheed and (2) a security interest in produc-
tion and other equipment owned by Lockheed and located in Los Angeles
county. The only fixed assets of significance not included as
collateral consisted of the Marietta, Georgia plant facility on which
the U. S. Government already had a lien.
2. Interest Rate and the Guarantee Fee
A major problem discussed during early meetings of the Board
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problem was one of trying to determine the risk to the government of
Lockheed not repaying the guaranteed portion of the loan. The interest
rate and guarantee fee were finally determined on the basis of two
principles
:
1. The banks should receive a rate of interest appropriate
for a risk—free guaranteed loan adjusted for "illiquidity"
(since the guaranteed loans do not have the ready market-
ability of government bills) and "additional servicing
costs"; and
2. The total financial charge to Lockheed should be that
rate which is appropriate for a loan of this risk (con-
sidering the government's unique collateral position)
and maturity; and furthermore, the total charge should
not be such as to allow Lockheed to acquire government
guaranteed funds at a lower cost than other companies
in similar circumstances can acquire non-guaranteed funds.
Thus, the guaranteed fee has the characteristics of both
a "risk premium" and a "competitive equalizer".
The risk free base used for determining the interest rate paid
to the banks was the average yield on outstanding nine-^nonth Treasury
bills, to which was added a 1/4 percent illiquidity premium plus a 1/8
percent allowance for the servicing cost of a guaranteed loan.
After taking into consideration the general maturity and risk
structure of interest rates, the rates paid on bank loans by large
companies in circumstances similar to Lockheed's (prime rate plus 1/4—
1/2 percent premium and standard compensatory balance requirement)
,
the rate borne by Lockheed on the nonguaranteed $400 million loan
(prime plus 1/2 percent with an additional 1/2 percent payable in the
future) , the value of the collateral covering the guaranteed loan, and
other related economic data, the Board decided at its meeting on
September 9, 1971, that the appropriate total charge to be borne by
Lockheed on its first takedown under the guarantee would be 8 percent.





The Board decided that a guarantee fee of 2.3 percent
would apply to the initial loan guarantee and to each subsequent loan
guarantee unless altered by the Board. This fee was, in fact, altered
on three different occasions prior to mid-April 1975 (see Exhibit III)
.
Guaranteed loans to Lockheed are evidenced by Lockheed's nine-
month promissory notes (the "guaranteed notes") . The nine month
maturity period was agreed upon as a result of restrictions imposed
by Lockheed's indenture for the outstanding debentures of 1956. As
the nine-month notes mature, Lockheed is permitted to refinance and
apply the proceeds to their payment.
3. The Emergency Loan Guarantee Fund
An Emergency Loan Guarantee Fund was established on the general
account of the Treasury. This Fund is credited with fees prescribed
by the Board in connection with each loan guaranteed under the act.
Rinds in excess of the Board's needs were invested in United States
Government Treasury Bills. Financial statements of the Board as of
30 September 1976 are shown in Exhibit IV. Exhibit V illustrates Board
actions over the years with regard to Lockheed operations [Refs. 8, 11,
12, 13, 10].
4. Summary
As of December 24, 1976 outstanding guaranteed loans totaled
$100 million. Repayment is now scheduled for December 1977 but can be
extended to December 1978. The General Accounting Office (GAO) , in a
report dated January 1976 [Ref . 14] , felt Lockheed would need the ex-
tension and still not repay the loan on time. This conflicts with
Lockheed management plans. Having paid off $95 million of the guaranteed
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Airline customers request security interest
in the collateral specified in the 1971 Credit
Agreement and the Security and Pledge Agree-
ment.
The Comptroller General in a letter to the
Board asserting the legal authority of the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) to review
the Board's decisions, requests access to the
Board's records for that purpose.
Board turns down GAO request to review deci-
sions but allows them to audit the Board's
records relating to its receipts and expendi-
tures.
GAO again asks to review records by which
decisions had been made. Again Board turns
down the request.
GAO reports the Board's negative reply to
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs; the committee expressed the
view that the Board should cooperate fully
with GAO.
Board makes available to GAO the information
requested.
Board meets with Lockheed's banks to discuss
higher than anticipated costs in the L-1011
program.
Board approves change in loan collateral.
Board approves Lockheed acquisition of Murdock
Machine and Engineering Company (manufacturer
of the L-1011 wing pylon)
.
Board approves Lockheed acquisition of $1
million in assets of Control's Division of

















Board expands monitoring of Lockheed. A tech-
nical analyst begins reviewing the L—1011 program.
Weekly paperwork now required of Lockheed.
In connection with Lockheed's purchase of cer-




approves a GSA promissory note secured by the
property to be acquired. This possession fee
liability did not affect the collateral pool
described in the 1971 Agreement.
Board approves Lockheed's request that would
allow it to escrow prepayments received from
foreign government customers to secure advanced
payments or performance guarantees.
Special Report to Congress recommends that the
guarantee program be disbanded and further
guarantee requests be considered on a case by
case basis by the Administration and the
Congress
.
Board approves amendment to 1971 agreement.
Board meets with Lockheed's banks to express
concern regarding Lockheed's financial problems
and to discuss possible solutions.
Board approves a new borrowing schedule to
meet Lockheed's higher than anticipated needs.
Board meets with Lockheed's banks again.
Board grants its consent to a new L-1011 sales
contract with Eastern Airlines allowing
delivery delays in 1974.
Board O.K.'s new bank agreement and $75 million
in additional credit. It also extends borrow-
ing until December 30, 1975.
Board consents to delay in TWA's delivery
schedule.
Board meets with Lockheed's banks to review
company forecasts and a proposed refinancing
plan which it approved. It also agreed to
extend guaranteed borrowing until December 1977.
The Board allowed Lockheed Shipbuilding and
Construction Company to obtain the necessary
working capital for a new contract award by














O.K.'d a schedule delay of L-1011 deliveries
to Eastern Airlines.
The Board chairman strongly condemns Lockheed's
foreign payments practices. Lockheed required
by the Board to stop improper payments to foreign
government officials or political organizations.
Board meets with principal officers of Lockheed
to discuss payments.
Board requires Lockheed to adopt strong inter-
nal measures with regard to a new policy on the
selection of international consultants.
Board asks Lockheed for additional information
so as to assess the potential impact of future
public disclosures of foreign payments. Board
takes steps to amend the 1971 credit agreement
by making improper payments an event of default
under that agreement. The Board requires Lock-
heed to submit periodic monitoring reports in-
dicating compliance with Lockheed's new policy
in the area of foreign payments.
The Board staff report concludes that Lockheed
could survive the effects of disclosure of past
foreign payments practices.
Board extends deadline for effectuating the
April 1975 financial restructuring plan.
Board meets with Lockheed officers regarding the
improper payments and changes in management
personnel.
The Board consents to Lockheed's request to
enter into a security agreement with the Canadian
Government securing the performance by Lockheed
of its obligations under a contract to manufacture
and sell long—range patrol aircraft to the
Canadian Government.
Board consents to the Company's request to
produce a Dash 500 version of the L—1011. Lock-
heed required to have receipt of a minimum
number of firm orders.
Board consents to the termination of the 1974
Agreement, which provided for an additional $75
million line of revolving credit.
Board modifies Dash 500 minimum firm order re-
quirements. Board consents to more borrowing
by Lockheed Shipbuilding and Construction from




September 1976 Board meets with representatives of Lockheed
and its banks to discuss the revised plan for
financial restructuring, the financial condi-
tion of the Company, the improper payments
and related matters. The Board retains its
right to declare a default on the 1971 loan
agreement with respect to any past improper
foreign payment which had not been disclosed
prior to September 8, 1976. The Board waives
its rights to declare a default for any prior
payments which had been disclosed previously.
September 1976 Board approves revised plan for financial
restructuring
.
Source: Emergency Loan Guarantee Board "Annual Reports," 1972—1976.
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toward complete repayment (see Exhibit VI) . Top management is working
hard to convince the banks to waive their rights under the loan guaran-
tee agreement. They believe the heavier interest burden on these loans
are more than the company should continue to pay. By late 1976 some of
Lockheed's creditors agreed with them [Ref. 15], In any case, GAO
concluded that Government interests are "adequately safeguarded". Thus
it is doubtful the U. S. Government will "lose" even if Lockheed does
fail. Any future guarantees under this Act seems unlikely but the






















III. THE TRISTAR AND LOCKHEED
During the early 1960s Lockheed Aircraft Corporation remained almost
entirely out of the commercial aircraft market. By 1966 this changed
as the potential need for a high capacity passenger transport was made
known fcy various airline officials.
Both domestic and international passenger traffic had been increasing
at significant rates during the period 1963 to 1966. Many airlines were
responding to this by adding more flights into some already overcrowded
airports. If this trend continued, passenger and aircraft congestion
at major airports would saturate their ability to handle projected traffic
loads. Both airport and aircraft planners had to come up with something
new — larger airports and larger aircraft to service them.
With many new routes beginning to develop, European aircraft manufac-
turers presented proposals for a high capacity "airbus". U. S. manufac-
turers were also encouraged to suggest ways to meet expanded airline
needs.
In 1966, the decision was made at Lockheed to develop a new commer-
cial wide-bodied jet. This decision, when combined with Lockheed's
strong financial position, appeared to be the right move at the right
time. By 1971 this decision, along with others in the defense area, was
to bring Lockheed to its knees financially. A summary of major L-1011
events during the 1966-1971 time frame reveals why.
A. SUMMARY OF EVENTS, L-1011 (1966-1971) [Ref. 16]

















Lockheed asks bid proposals on "jumbo jet"
engines, landing gear and automatic flight con-
trol system.
Lockheed registers $125 million debenture-be-
lieved necessary to help finance the new airplane.
The decision is made to "go" on the CL-1011
project.
Lockheed announced publicly its commercial air-
craft plans.
First L—1011 setback for Lockheed as American
Airlines picks the McDonnell Douglas DC-10.
L—1011 price lowered from $17 million to $15
million per aircraft in response to DC-10 price
reduction.
Orders had been received for 172 L-lOll's.
Rolls Royce selected to produce the engines.
Lockheed officials predict a need for 1400
L-1011 's by 1980 with more than half to be sold
by 1975.
Defense contract problems hit Lockheed having
a major effect on L-1011 financing. New orders
came very slowly.
Lockheed asks the Defense Department for $650
million in assistance over the next three years.
They claim government programs are eating into
L—1011 funding. Sec. Packard suggests receiver-
ship or merger as solution.
Banks say they are not willing to renew and/or
increase Lockheed's line of credit while the
government contracts dispute is still unsettled.
Chairman Haughton persuades Lockheed's banks to
exchange $400 million line of unsecured credit
for $500 million unsecured loan. He also per-
suades major L-1011 buyers to advance $100
million.
Rolls Royce announces that development costs on
L—1011 engine (RB-211) have more than doubled
original estimates. Top Rolls management resigns.
Lockheed agrees to accept $200 million loss on
C-5A. Rolls Royce declares bankruptcy.
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March 1971 Lockheed-British Government talks on RB-211
future.
April 1971 New contract worked out on RB-211. British
Government and Lockheed banks insist that the
U. S. Government provide guarantees for future
loans to Lockheed.
May 1971 Nixon Administration asks Congress to approve
U. S. guarantees for bank loans totalling $250
million to Lockheed.
B. THE L-1011 DEBATE
After months of hearings the L-1011 had been scrutinized in every
way possible. Expert witnesses, committee reports, Civil Aeronautics
Board reports, DOD analysis and union leaders 1 opinions were discussed
daily.
Major arguments included:
1. Pro—Loan L-1011 Arguments
— "An estimated 60,000 persons would lose their jobs" [if the
L—1011 is terminated-prime contractor and subcontractors.
]
-Sec. of Treasury [Ref. 2, p. 157]
— "The continued production and development of the L-1011 will
maintain the healthy competitive and productive capacity of the
airline industry and will most certainly be in the national
interest." -FAA official [Ref. 2, p. 157]
— " [Air] carriers stand to lose all or a substantial part of
their investment." -CAB Chairman [Ref. 2, p. 157]
— "Bankruptcy would not only eliminate the jobs of workers at
Lockheed but those of Lockheed's suppliers and subcontractors
throughout the nation." -Union leader [Ref. 2, p. 157]
— "If Lockheed is lost only two competitors will remain."
—TWA Airline official [Ref. 2, p. 157]
— "Some broad guarantee program is needed to aid large companies
in trouble when their collapse would result in serious reper-
cussions throughout the economy." —former FRB Chairman
[Ref. 17].
— "We have a huge investment in L—1011 inventories. There
is no way to realize any substantial amount from this inventory
other than by delivery of aircraft. We lack the resources to
complete and deliver aircraft on which we hold firm orders,
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unless we have a government guarantee. If we are unable to
carry out the L-1011 program Lockheed will surely go bankrupt."
—Lockheed official [Ref. 18]
— "Past Defense Department policies have encouraged defense
contractors to take on programs such as the L-1011 which were
beyond their means." —DOD official [18]
— "The private sector and the public sector must work together."
—
"There is a credit crisis in many major companies and local
governments"—"Lockheed's dilemma provides only a start on a
public-private capital program." -Bank officials [Ref. 19]
2. Anti-Loan L-1011 Arguments
— "The U. S. economy will gain $6.4 billion in G.N. P. over the
next few years if the L-1011 is cancelled because of the lower
foreign labor content of the DC-10. There would be a $1.7
billion favorable impact on the U.S. balance of payments during
the next decade if the L-1011 program is terminated."
-^Aerospace Report'1 [Ref . 20]
— "Lockheed is likely to lose as much as $2 billion on the
L-1011 program and these losses will only increase if the
program is continued. " -Aerospace Report \20]
— "The L-1011 contains serious technical deficiencies including
inadequate engine thrust, excessive weight, and questionable
design features for a commercial aircraft." -Aerospace Report
[20]
— "There is not enough business for three firms in the wide-^
bodied jet field and Lockheed's entry will severely cripple
the present dominant U. S. position." -Aerospace Reportl{20]
— "Short term unemployment in California as a result of can-
celling the L-1011 should be offset in six to nine months by
high DC—10 employment." -Aerospace Report^ [20]
— "Tristar had an American content of only 60%." — "If Tristar
orders were diverted to McDonnell—Douglas DC—10, with a 90%
U. S. labor content there ultimately would be a net gain in
jobs." -U. S. Senator [Ref. 2, p. 161]
— "We are also being asked to rescue—indirectly-a large
British company in direct competition with American firms."
-U. S. Senator [Ref. 2, p. 156]
Some believed that this Aerospace Report was from a major competi-
tor of Lockheed. It was entered into the Congressional Record by
Senator William Proxmire after considerable debate.
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— "The guarantee would be fundamentally inconsistent with a
free enterprise system, would involve government favoritism
toward Lockheed in relation to its competitors and might lead
to similar guarantee's for other aerospace firms." -House
Banking Committee Staff Report [Ref. 2, p. 154]
— "Conflicting information on L—1011 breakeven point indicates
the actual breakeven will probably be much higher than Lockheed
projections." -House Banking Committee Staff Report [Ref. 2,
p. 154]
— "On the whole monopoly [in the airbus market] is preferable
to artificial competition." -Academic Dean [17]
— "If the L—1011 program were scrapped several hundred addi-
tional DC—10 's would be manufactured by McDonnell Douglas and
the effects of the shift from the L—1011 with a British made
engine to the DC-10 with an American made General Electric
engine would be highly advantageous to the American aerospace
worker." -New Jersey UAW official [18]
— "Lockheed is carrying unencumbered assets with a book value
of $160 million and a current or insurable value of $400
million—which would be available to the banks to secure the
additional $250 million without guarantees." -University
Professor [Ref. 3, p. 702]
C. PUTTING BACK THE PIECES-1971, AFTER THE LOAN
1. New Financing
After passage of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act, Lockheed
went to work to get a new financing package completed by the end of
August. In order to qualify for the guaranteed credit they would have
to shuffle unpledged assets to produce the needed $250 million col-
lateral. $153 million worth of capital stock of four subsidiaries
was finally pledged along with Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., with
an estimated $100 million in book value. The government would have a
preferred position on $250 million of the $253 million in collateral
until the guaranteed loan was repaid. After repayment, the $250
million in assets would be applied to the $400 million previously
loaned Lockheed by its 24 banks. The remaining portion of the new $750
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million financing package was expected to cane frcm U. S. L-1011
customers in the form of $100 million in accelerated progress payments
due in 1972 [Kef. 21]
.
2. Airline Negotiations
Since delays and price changes had taken place in the D-1011
program, Lockheed officials had to begin delicate renegotiation of
airline contracts. With Delta and TWA accounting for 51 of Lockheed's
103 firm orders and 17 of its 75 options, these carriers would have
the greatest bargaining power. Among their early demands were [Ref . 22]
(a) Lockheed must have a firm contract with Rolls Royce which
should include delivery dates and support commitments.
(b) There should be a commitment from British European Airways
for an L—1011 order.
(c) There must be a settlement of all outstanding defense
contract problems before they would commit themselves
further to the L—1011 program.
(d) L—1011 orders should be eligible for an investment tax
credit.
(e) All other firm order customers must remain in the L-1011
program as a condition to their staying with the program.
(f) Lockheed must renegotiate all option schedules and terms.
As a further hammer both airlines held firm price agreements
with McDonnell Douglas on the DC-10 aircraft. Competitive price would
be a big factor in any sales talks.
In addition to the airline customers, Lockheed was required
by the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board to have reached agreement with
all major L—1011 parties. This would include its 24 banks and its
engine supplier, Rolls Royce Ltd. The first meeting of the loan Board




New government economic programs caused problems in the airline
negotiations. A new 10% import surcharge added further costs to the
HB-211 L-1011 engines. This new tax would cost an additional $280,000
per shipset (three engines) . The airlines wanted the additional expense
shared, while Lockheed wanted the airline customers to pay the entire
amount [Ref . 23]
.
The negotiations were very difficult with agreements becoming
harder to obtain as time went by, with the $100 million in advanced
progress payments a particularly sticky point. Varying airline needs
also became an issue during the talks. Delta Airlines held out for
specific delivery delays and thus was against advanced payments, while
others wanted a longer range version L-1011. 1VJA wanted its option
dates extended through June of 1972. There was unanimous agreement
that Lockheed's mere existence was a major concern.
By September the major customer airlines were expressing con-
fidence in the future and were satisfied that the loan Board would
accept the compromise that had been reached. The airlines would pick
up the 10% surcharge on the engines and advance the $100 million during
November 1972.
3. Agreements
By mid—September Lockheed had signed contracts with its 24
banks, its major Tristar customers and the U. S. Government. The most
immediate effect of the signing was to clear the way for the first
guaranteed borrowing. This amount—$50 million-was urgently needed to
cover the $5 million weekly payroll on the L-1011 program. Since some
of the uncertainty in operations was removed, Lockheed could also





During the remaining months of 1971 production line and test-
ing problems would continue to cast a shadow over the Ir-1011. Small,
nagging items caused considerable trouble for both Lockheed and Rolls
Royce. With pre-certification flight hours now adding up, lingering
doubts remained. How would the PB-211 stack up against the General
Electric engines on the DC-10? Was there sufficient growth potential
in the Ir-1011? Having survived a financial crisis could Lockheed
afford any major technical problems? These and other questions would
have to wait for some time before any clear answers would develop.
Lockheed appeared to be back from the dead by December of
1971. They had managed to better their own financial forecasts with
surprising results in defense projects, (see Exhibits VII, VIII, IX)
Lower fixed assets expenditures, lower inventories and greater customer
advances than expected (in programs other than the L-1011) resulted in
an improved cash flow, which reduced borrowing requirements. Total
bank borrowings were $475 million by the end of the year instead of
the $520 million anticipated.
Lockheed also took firm steps to reduce costs. Besides reduc-
ing the overall work force they cut their overhead, sold non-productive
property and held new plant and equipment expenditures to a minimum.
More selective bidding and the careful use of research and development
funds lowered the level of new business expenditures. A conscientious
program of waste reduction was having a positive effect [8]
.
The newly restructured AH—56A and C—5A contracts were in effect
by the end of the year. The switch from fixed price to cost reimburse-
ment contracts permitted the sale of inventories on hand under these
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programs. With the risk factor reduced and better cost control measures
in effect the cash drain from these programs had finally stopped. The
potential to once again attain the top position among defense contractors
seemed possible as the new year began.
EXHIBIT VII
—LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 1971 EARNINGS STATEMENT




Sales 2,852.4 2,994.0 (141.6)
Interest and Other Income 6.4 6.1 .3
Total 2,858.8 3,000.1 (141.3)
Interest Expense 33.3 37.2 (3.9)
Other Expenses and Costs 2,800.1 2,940.8 (140.7)
Total 2,833.4 2,978.0 (144.6)
Operating Income (Loss) 25.4 22.1 3.3
Provision for Taxes 13.8 10.8 3.0
Total 11.6 11.3 .3




*Operating Statement "Actual," certified to by Arthur Young & Company,
Certified Public Accountants.
Note: The Auditor's Report for 1971 continues to express a qualified
opinion. Specifically, the opinion is "...subject to the
realization of L—1011 Tristar inventories and finalization of
amendments to certain ship construction contracts ..."
Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.




—LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION BALANCE SHEET AS COMPARED TO





























































Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Column "Actual" taken from
Statements certified to be Arthur Young & Company, Certified
Public Accountants.




—LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION 1971 NET OPERATING INCOME




























Less: Provision for Taxes
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NOte: Operating Loss on the L-1011 program includes general and
administrative expense of $38.3 million and $40 million of
certain disruption costs in connection with the Rolls—Royce
receivership that interrupted and delayed the Tristar program.
(By the end of 1971, Lockheed had charged to income $158
million of Tristar costs.)
Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, "First Annual Report."
D. 1972 - 1975
The years since the 1971 disruption have been difficult for Lockheed
and many other businesses. Inflation, recession, oil embargoes and
little or no growth hit many very hard. This was magnified somewhat
for firms like Lockheed who were also dependent on a dwindling defense
procurement budget. But their largest non-defense effort ever continued
to be the biggest headache.
1. The Airline Industry
L—1011 sales depend upon orders from airlines which are depen-
dent on healthy passenger traffic. During the L-1011 planning and early
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development stages airline industry growth was considered excellent.
Domestic passenger traffic increases averaged about 9.3% over a 10 year
(1964-1974) period, with the peak years during the middle 60' s. During
the same time international passenger traffic managed a growth rate of
5.5%. These early growth trends led to optimistic forecasts for wide-
bodied jet sales prior to and immediately after the 1971 time frame.
In 1971, Lockheed was forecasting sales of 220 L-1011's by 1977 with a
market requirement for 775 airbuses by 1980. Secretary of Transporta-
tion, John Volpe, using Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) growth
forecasts, predicted a market demand for 760 three engine wide bodied
aircraft during the 1970' s. A CAB study put the figure at 798 over the
same ten year period. Every forecast used a "reasonable" airline
traffic growth rate of ten percent per year in computing their forecasts.
Assuming the demand for L—1011's was as expected by Lockheed, break-even
was put in the 255—265 range. With 176 orders for the L—1011 by Decem-
ber 31, 1972, there was little reason to believe these goals would not
be met. Then conditions changed.
During the summer and fall of 1973 airline revenue passenger
traffic growth became extremely sluggish. The Arab oil embargo, begin-
ning in October 1973, resulted in higher fuel costs and further compli-
cated the outlook for the future. Operating costs skyrocketed as fuel
prices doubled almost overnight. Scheduled flights were cut back sharp-
ly throughout the industry and a significant number of aircraft were
temporarily grounded. The overall growth rate declined from 11.1% in
1972 to 6.9% in 1973 with the majority of this decline taking place
during the latter half of the year. This slowdown had an immediate
effect on Lockheed when three of its customers, TWA, Eastern, and
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Pacific Southwest Airways (PSA) requested delivery delays. The uncer-
tain environment facing Lockheed's other customers caused them to
postpone either the exercising of existing options or the placing of
new orders.
Higher fuel costs continued to plague the airlines throughout
1974 and 1975 and inflation helped cut passenger travel growth to a
year-to-year increase of less than 2%. As a consequence, demand for
wide-bodied aircraft remained depressed [Kef . 25]
.
2. Selling the TriStar
Sales of the Tristar were non-existent during the early months
of 1972, while its major competitor, the DC-10, fared somewhat better
because of its more versatile configurations. Lockheed did not have
a long range version of the L-1011 and estimates of development costs
exceeding $70 million were holding back any decision in this direction.
By early February a 5% increase in the basic Ir-1011 price was thought
to be necessary but had to be put off because of the lack of demand
[Ref . 26] . Despite a recently devalued dollar, increased costs would
have to be absorbed.
The early pessimism caused by the slow sales diminished somewhat
by mid—April. After a successful test program and FAA certification,
Chairman Daniel Haughton announced that the Lr-1011 would go long range.
With this declaration Mr. Haughton' s immediate problems were to (a) con-
vince Rolls—Royce Ltd. to build the necessary higher thrust engines,
(b) convince the British Government to help finance the new engine
development, (c) get the estimated $70 million necessary to cover air-
frame development costs, and (d) find airlines willing to purchase this




Quick simple decisions were not about to develop in this type
of environment. Two typical problems that had to be faced were [26]
:
(1) The British Government was not going to put up the
necessary $52 million for the bigger engine unless
Lockheed was going to build an airplane that needed
it. Lockheed could not build the extended range
airplane if it did not get a commitment that the
bigger engine would be available.
(2) Although not building the long range L-1011 might
doom all the L-1011 program, building a truly long
range trijet competitive with the DC—10—30 might
doom it also.
Still the thrill of seeing its first L-1011 go into service with
Eastern Airlines overshadowed the immediate problems and led to
even greater plans.
By May 1972 the talk was of two new versions of the L-1011.
Along with a modified extended range version (designated the L-1011—
100) would be added the L-1011 stretched fuselage version. This plane
would be aimed directly at the high density, low fare, inclusive—tour
European market. According to Chairman Haughton, the demand for this
new stretched airplane could exceed 250, of which the last 100 would
be profitable.
Mr. Haughton 's new announcement caused quite a stir. More
than a few Lockheed corporate executives wished he had said nothing
at all about stretching the lr-1011. They felt that the timing was in-
appropriate since Lockheed was working on bank approval of the long
range L-1011 and there was a general softness in the airline industry.
Nevertheless he continued to speak out. Since the basic L-1011 would
make its international debut in London during August, interest would




— two fuselage plugs ahead and aft of the wing.
— removing the capacity for about 30,000 lbs of fuel.
— using 42,000 lb thrust engines with the capacity to retrofit
to the 45,000 lb version.
This would allow for a range-limited airplane (about 3000
nautical miles) but would accommodate 50 more passengers for a total
of 400 in high density seating.
Lockheed officials were unanimous in their feelings of kinship
with Rolls Royce. With a good possibility of a new engine they con-
sidered that Lockheed, Rolls Royce and the British government were
firm partners in the entire L-1011 program. The goal was to develop
the basic L-1011 into a family of aircraft. The extended range version
was aimed at the North Atlantic areas , the stretched version was to be
used within Europe and the basic L-1011 was to cover the continental
United States. It was projected that the L-1011 price would be lower
than all comparable DC-10's. Predictions of need by major airlines
included [26]
:
Air Canada 25 (extended range)
BQAC2 30 (extended range)
TtiA 50 (extended range)
BEA2 30 (basic model)
British Caledonia2 17 (extended range)
Turkish Airlines 6 (extended range)
All-Nippon 40 (both models)
Japan Airlines 15 (both models)
The airbus market in the U. S. had all but dried up by mid-year
1972; so, it was with much relief for Lockheed officials when British
European Airways (BEA) ordered six of the basic L-1011' s and optioned
presumably some of the British planes would be the stretch version,
but this was not specified.
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for six of the long range variety. Although less than expected, it was
felt that these initial orders would "get the ball rolling." It was the
first sale of any consequence in almost two years and had been eagerly
awaited. Perhaps now the charter airlines in Europe and national air-
lines in the MidEast and Far East would "jump on the bandwagon" [Ref . 27]
.
Mixed results continued throughout 1972. Although a total of 29
orders were received for the Tristar, only eight of these were firm.
The other 22 were options which called for a rrdnimum down payment. This
would be forfeited should the order be cancelled. Of the 21 aircraft
promised for delivery during 1972 only 17 were completed [11]
.
Rolls Royce and the British Government began development on a
new 48,000 lb thrust engine in late 1972. This would boost the basic
L-1011 range to an expected 3900 miles and not require the large new
development investment by Lockheed. This range was apparently satisfac-
tory to a number of airlines. Yet Lockheed officials still dreamed of
a "new" truly long range aircraft.
a. Orders Diminish
The slower than expected sales during 1972 [Ref. 28] looked
good compared to the next three years. Although 23 Tristars were
ordered during 1973 only seven of these were firm [Ref. 29] . Orders for
10 aircraft in 1974 [Ref. 30] were followed by zero orders in 1975
[Ref. 31] . The recession had finally caught up with Lockheed. It was
a scramble in many ways just to keep the option orders alive. Many
times special extensions of the option cancellation dates were necessary
to prevent an option from being dropped [Ref. 32]
.
The difficulties experienced by Lockheed's customers and the
downward revisions of their anticipated needs for fleet additions
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prompted seme airlines to request delivery delays and in one case can-
cellation. In March 1975 Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) requested
that Lockheed defer delivery of one L-1011 and cancel two other orders.
By June they had further notified Lockheed that they would not accept
delivery on the already scheduled dates and would not accept two addi-
tional aircraft which were also under contract [31] . This unusual
circumstance, plus the return of two other aircraft sold earlier under
a market support agreement, put Lockheed in a very awkward situation.
They were now reselling their own jets in the market place at a lower
price than the newer ones they were producing. In effect they were
competing against themselves and could only lose.
Early in 1974 the modified L—1011—2 plans were put aside
[Ref . 33] . The market was not there but the competition was. Going
ahead with these plans would have put the L—1011 in direct competition
with the long range DG-10 and the Boeing 747, which were not selling
well either. With this postponement, a possible $100 million financing
package from Summa Corporation (see section III. D. 3. a) was allowed to
lapse [Ref. 34] . Lockheed would instead concentrate on less extensive
modifications which could increase the L—1011 1 s range enough to cross
the Atlantic safely. Eventually two modified versions (L-1011—100 and
L-1011—200) would be developed to meet the different needs of the many
different airlines. A comparison of these versions is shown in
Exhibit X. The Rolls Royce RB-211—22F would be ready in mid-1976 while
the 524-engine with 48,000 lb thrust was expected to be available in
1977.
Most of the sales that did take place during 1974 were of
the longer range varieties (L-1011—100) and were to foreign air
carriers. Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific Airways placed the first firm
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long range order in March 1974. The purchase of two planes outright
and options for two more caused quite a stir. This $100 million order





lockheed officials now optimistically predicted other sales
based on this airline's show of confidence. New sales in April to
Saudi Arabian Airlines brought further confidence.
One of the more promising L-1011 sales rumors came from the
Soviet Union. Lockheed was working hard on a route study for Aeroflot
which would provide the Russians with recommendations on fleet size,
aircraft types and, ultimately the sale of 30 or more long—range version
L—lOll's. Officials admitted that any sale of this type would be
steeped in controversy and red tape. Nevertheless Lockheed officials
conferred with the Russians many times in 1974 [Ref. 36] .
b. Textron 's Deadline
During 1974 a possible IxDckheed-Textron recapitalization
plan developed in which aircraft sales were to be an important part.
(See section III.D.3.b) A major stipulation was that Lockheed would
find 45 firm orders for the L-1011 by 30 November 1974. These orders
would be sufficient to bring the total program, including airplanes
already delivered to 180.
Airline reaction among Lockheed's best customers was, on
the whole, negative. One spokesman asked why the airlines should put
up more money now (down payments on additional orders) while Textron
"gets all the goodies—a 45% control for $5 per share" [Ref. 37] . Delta
Airline's spokesman predicted lots of pressure to firm its options (it
had 18 as of June) . Eastern and 1WA expressed similar feelings. "If





The major carriers claimed that setting a deadline
(November 30) was unrealistic, when ordering large airplanes involving
millions of dollars. Airlines need to know what the traffic will allow
in the coming years before raising and carmitting large sums of money.
During 1974 traffic and predictions indicated downward trends.
During the months that followed the pressure developed as
predicted. Mr. Haughton and Mr. Miller (Textron Chairman) made joint
sales calls on a half-dozen U. S., Canadian and British airlines urging
them to firm up options. With money tight, profits and traffic down
and operating costs up, few airlines were eager to bite [Ref . 38] . By
September the November 30th deadline had been pushed back into December,
and by December 14th it was changed again to February of 1975. It
finally became necessary to change the terms of the agreement (eliminat-
ing the 45 aircraft requirement) to give any hope that a deal would be
finalized [Ref. 39]
.
Despite the paucity of new orders (10) during 1974, Lockheed
did manage to deliver on time all 41 aircraft. It was hoped delivery
schedules and predicted new orders would also be met during 1975.
With the overall condition of the airline industry worsening
and the slowing general state of the economy having its effect, no new
orders for the L-1011 were placed during 1975. Two customers, by sell-
ing their L-1011 's, managed to divert at least five additional orders
from Lockheed's books. Others indicated their intension to defer new
equipment purchases by extending the service lives and increasing the
seating density of their existing fleets. It was necessary to extend
the cancellation dates on second-buy orders for 35 Tristars and cancel
two others during 1975 [31] . This negative trend in sales became most
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noticeable after July when disclosures of foreign "facilitating" pay-
ments became public. Lockheed officials feared the loss of many
unfilled foreign orders (military and commercial) should the names
of foreign officials and political organizations that had benefitted
become known. Indeed, even without names, they feared that adverse
publicity would affect future sales. Total sales through 30 September
1976 are shown in Exhibit XI [10 and 13]
.
3. Financing Lockheed
The Government loan guarantee was an integral part of Lock-
heed 's borrowing arrangements in 1971. These arrangements are
summarized below:
(1) Lockheed's banks provide credit extension in an amount up
to $650 million of which $400 million represents re-
financing of a loan previously extended by these same
banks. The remaining $250 million is available to Lock-
heed under the terms of the Government's Guarantee
Agreement.
(2) Lockheed's three major airline customers agreed to make
an additional $100 million in prepayments above those
already scheduled.
(3) The underlying $400 million bank loans must be outstand-
ing before any guaranteed loans are extended, and the
guaranteed portion must be the first to be repaid. The
guaranteed portion must be repaid within five years with
a possible three year extension.
(4) A Security and Pledge Agreement between Lockheed and its
banks provides for the creation of a single pool of
collateral consisting of certain assets of Lockheed which
are being held as security for the $650 million credit.
This collateral would be used first for the repayment of
the Government guaranteed portion of the loans.
Since the $400 million was outstanding by August 1971 the
guaranteed bank borrowing commenced almost immediately. These loans
totaled $75 million by the end of 1971.
3 • •
"Facilitating" payments became a term used by corporate officials
to describe foreign payments. The more harsh critics preferred to call
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Lockheed's early forecasts projected borrowings of $550 million
which would peak by September 1972. They predicted the guaranteed
portion of the loan would be repaid by the end of 1974. This projec-
tion was to change several times during the coming years (see Exhibit
VT)
.
The bank borrowings for 1971 were actually less than the company
had originally projected because of higher operating profits on programs
other than the L-1011. A deferred liability to the U. S. Government
for $100 million plus two debenture issues brought the total long term
debt to $707 million at the close of 1971 [8]
.
An attempt to tap the equity market for funds during 1972
failed. With Lockheed stock selling at about $12 early in the year,
the Board of Directors voted to increase the authorized number of shares
from 20 to 30 million. This increase would have to be ratified during
the annual meeting in May. The hope was that introduction of the L—1011
and other "good news" announcements would increase the market value of
Lockheed's stock and allow them to fatten its equity with a new issue.
The major banks indicated that they would support any attempt to in-
crease the company's capitalization [27]. Before the end of the year
the possibility of another convertible debenture offering was also
brought up but both of these plans to use the capital markets failed.
The increased stock price did not come about and the debenture support
failed to materialize.
By the end of 1972, Lockheed's guaranteed borrowing amounted
to $130 million and ominous words were coming from GAO. At hearings
before the Joint Economic Subcommittee in December, Elmer Staats, the
Comptroller General, told members that Lockheed sales were running far
below the company's breakeven point. Unless the company received a
54

"substantial number" of additional orders, the L-1011 program could
impair the financial condition of the company [Ref . 40] . As Lockheed
was the nation's number one defense firm, the Congress and the Defense
Department had good reason for concern,
a. Merger Sought
Throughout 1972 a merger partner was sought as a way to
help ease this impending financial crisis. In February rumors began
to fly that General Dynamics might be interested. Most analysts dis-
counted a GD-Lockheed merger because neither could do the other any
good. General Dynamics had more than its share of home grown troubles
without taking on Lockheed's also. Any partner for Lockheed must have
a balance sheet capable of supporting over $700 million in long term
debt [Ref . 41]
.
Lockheed financial bosses were trying to "sell" a merger
based on Lockheed's successful performance prior to the L—1011 and
associated problems. The pro-merger forces contended that any risk
involved would be richly rewarded but by December 1973, despite active
solicitation, there had been no takers.
The reasons for this lack of interest were many but the
sheer magnitude of the debt was certainly foremost. By mid-year 1972
it was apparent that Lockheed's credit would be strained even more
by the events taking place.
Investors' lack of confidence resulted in Lockheed's stock
falling to an all time low of 2 3/4 during 1973. Although this stock
price drop was caused in part by a bearish stock market and a growing
recession, many analysts were predicting bankruptcy by the end of the
year. With the repayment of the guaranteed loans now moved to 1977 by
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Lockheed forecasters, there again appeared a need for more short term
"quick" financing to meet the company's cash requirements.
The L-1011 burden became heavier in 1973. Approximately
$900 million in L-1011 gross inventory recovery was dependent upon the
receipt of future firm orders. The cost and selling price of current
orders was based on a 300 aircraft L-1011 program. This produced a
zero gross profit in 1973 and this trend was expected to continue well
into the future. At the 1973 pace the final realization of L-1011
development, tooling and production start up costs could extend into
the early 1980' s [11]. Given the worsening state of the airline in-
dustry even these figures were over-optimistic. Delivery delays and
option cancellations would severely reduce the chances of recovering
Lockheed's L-1011 investment.
Potential financing for the future long range version L-1011
did appear during 1973. Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation agreed to buy
$100 million in new Lockheed convertible debentures and notes to help
finance the venture. $50 million would be convertible into common stock
and $50 million directly convertible in L-1011 's [34] . This credit
expired in 1974 when Lockheed decided not to develop the long—range
L-1011.
Merger studies continued throughout 1974 under the direction
of Lazard Freres and Company, the investment banking firm hired in
December 1973. Finally in May the name was dropped that was to continue
to stir controversy throughout the year—Textron Inc.!
b. The Lockheed-Textron Plan
Textron, a large industrial conglomerate based in Providence,
Rhode Island ($1.9 billion sales in 1973) appeared very interested in
56

Lockheed ($2.8 billion in sales in 1973), but strings were attached,
and it would be a very complex arrangement if consummated.
By early April 1974, two positive arrangements had taken
place which apparently pleased Textron 's management: the early sales
of modified L—lull's to Cathay Pacific Airways and the favorable in-
crease in short term credit to Lockheed from its lending banks. In a
memorandum to the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board in June, Chairman
Haughton (Lockheed) and Chairman Miller (Textron) explained the plans
(see Appendix C) [12].
The proposed arrangement was not a merger. Textron and
Lockheed were to operate as separate entities, with many others having
a say in the final agreement. The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board, the
British Government and Rolls Royce, the airline customers and Lockheed's
banks would have to approve the plan. Lockheed and Textron' s directors
and stockholders, the SEC and the anti-trust division of the Justice
Department were also very interested.
Many analysts felt Textron 's move, with the conditions it
wanted, would be very smart indeed. Potential benefits were:
(a) As a 45% owner of Lockheed common, Textron could add 45% of
any Lockheed earnings to its own income. That could mean
nearly $1 per share to Textron in 1975 if Lockheed earns the
$2 per share some analysts forecast.
(b) Eventual retirement of the preferred stock would reduce
Textron 's investment to the $60 million it proposes to pay
for the new common stock issue. This would be less than
Textron' s investment in its biggest holding (Aerospace
Group)
.
(c) Rejection of the merger route at that time did not preclude Tex-
tron from merging with Lockheed later. It did limit
Textron' s liability to the $85 million investment it pro-
poses. Unmerged, Textron would not be responsible for any
unforeseen future debts or losses Lockheed might incur.
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(d) Writing off the L-1011 costs, at minimum, would mean that the
programwould stop showing losses and could begin producing
a book profit if firm orders passed the 180 goal. Just
cutting out the L—1011 losses meant that Lockheed's large
and profitable government programs, $165 million before
taxes and interest in 1973, could exert considerable upward
leverage on earnings of which Textron will own 45%.
Textron would also give up something by refusing the
merger route. That would be the federal income tax offsets Lockheed
losses on the L-1011 had provided [Ref . 42] . Despite that disadvan-
tage G. William Miller called the plan a "once in a lifetime
opportunity" [Ref. 43]. Textron stockholders apparently didn't think
so, as Textron 's stock plunged over 33% by the end of the year [Ref.
44].
In December some of the conditions of the original agree-
ment were changed. Textron eliminated the 45 new firm order require-
ment as long as Lockheed would now write off $800 million before
taxes instead of the $600 million originally proposed. Lockheed's
banks were also asked to accept a higher debt/equity ratio than pro-
posed in the original plans. Lockheed stockholders' equity would be
about $150 million after the writeoff and refinancing, about $220
million less than before [Ref. 45] . By early 1975, an apparently
unrelated matter, Navy shipbuilding claims, killed the deal.
Although officially claiming the Textron arrangement was
killed by the disputed Navy claims, G. William Miller, the Textron
Chairman, claimed old age helped kill the deal also. "Dragging as it
did for nine months, the plan began to develop arthritis. We could
hear cracks in the joints" [Ref . 46]. Whatever the reason was, the .
$100 million infusion of funds would be sorely missed. With this
capital need, Lockheed went to work almost immediately to find another
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partner. General Dynamics (again) the Rockwell Corporation and Hughes'
Surma Corporation were all mentioned as prospective saviors [Ref . 47]
.
c. A New Credit Agreement
Ihe lack of new L—1011 orders continued to cause cash flow
problems for Lockheed. This situation resulted in the acceptance of
a credit extension of $75 million by Lockheed's banks in April 1974
[Ref. 48] . This new borrowing arrangement would be short term and
secured by flight line and finished L-1011 transports awaiting delivery
under firm customer orders and by the stock of Lockheed Aircraft Cor-
poration. Along with this agreement, it was also announced that,
although this new credit would help, an extension of the loan guaran-
tees would be needed beyond the present December 31, 1975 deadline.
The additional $75 million credit was to become an integral
part of a three phase agreement between Lockheed and its lending banks.
Phase I, which was to become effective April 1, 1975, extended the
company's financing including the Government's guarantee. Phase II
contemplated the conversion of a portion of the underlying nonguaran—
teed bank loans covered by the 1971 Agreement to preferred stock; and
Phase III contemplated an exchange offer of preferred stock for out-
standing convertible debentures, and an additional conversion of non-
guaranteed debt to preferred stock. Both Phases II and III were sub-
ject to SEC and stockholder approval (See Appendix D for more details)
.
With the extended credit arrangements and the willingness
of Lockheed's banks to restructure the debt, the banks would get some-
thing in return — a formal voice in the operation of Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. This role in the management would come in the form of
voting rights on 2,750,000 shares of the new preferred stock issue.
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Each preferred share would be entitled to one vote. Although this
was something the banks had resisted for sane time (getting into the
operation of a company to which they lend) , the situation had forced
them to become more active [Ref . 49]
.
d. New Standards
During 1974 the Financial Accounting Standards Board took
a controversial step toward correcting balance sheet valuation prob-
lems for Lockheed and others in the recent past. Beginning in 1974
all research and development costs (except those directly reimbursable
by others) would be treated as an expense in the year they occurred;
past capitalization costs would have to be written off against retained
earnings. This new standard would have a tremendous affect on both
Lockheed and its commercial competitor, McDonnell Douglas (which had
capitalized close to 1/2 billion dollars of R&D expenditures itself)
.
Although not effective until 1975, Lockheed officials announced to its
stockholders they would implement the change in 1974. By year end a
net amount of $448 million was removed from L-1011 inventories. This
net write-off reduced the equity by $275 million to $27 million [30]
There remained, however, over $500 million in production and tooling
costs in inventory that would be recoverable only if sales of L-1011
aircraft exceeded the orders already on hand [12]
.
e. Government Payback Begins
Lockheed did make progress in reducing its guaranteed loan
commitnrent during 1974. From a high of $245 million in September, they
were able to reduce this to $195 million by the end of the year. The
burden of high interest charges was especially heavy on these loans.
They paid over 13% for money borrowed during the August-September 1974
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period [34] . Total interest expense, as a result, increased to $103
million in 1974 from $69 million in 1973 [29]
.
f
. The 1975 Financial Picture
Despite the overwhelming concern with the "kickback" issue
(see Section III.D.7) several financial events of importance took place
during 1975. By mid-year it was apparent that earlier company fore-
casts on repaying the guaranteed loan had changed [13] . An updated
forecast at this time from Lockheed showed that some outstanding
guaranteed indebtedness would still remain as of December 1977, the
date on which the original extension would run out. This would leave
only a one-year extension for which the company may apply.
With sales increasing, bank borrowings at the end of 1975
remained at $595 million, the same as at year—end 1974, including the
$195 million guaranteed by the U. S. Government (see Exhibits XII and
XIII) . Although there had been no new borrowing, there also had been
no repayment. The cost of this borrowing in 1975 averaged 7.3%, down
from 11.6% in 1974. This decline was primarily due to a lower prime
rate and provisions of Phase I of the refinancing and recapitalization
plan.
By December 1975 Tristar inventories (Exhibit XIV) , reflect-
ing the changes in accounting, could be compared to the non-Tristar
inventory position. Customer advances as of December 28, 1975 included
$26 million in interest-bearing prepayments from airline customers.






LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION INCOME STATEMENT
(in millions of dollars)
1971 1972 1973 74-75




L-1011 — 302 730 811 559 -252





848 905 967 1,153 1,263 110
Shipbuilding,
113 96 53 60 107 47
2,852 2,473 2,757 3,279 3,387 108
Operating Profit. (41) 26 82 127 147 20
Interest, other... 6 7 7 11 10 -1
Earnings before (35) 33 89 138 157 19
Interest&Taxes.
Interest Expense. 33 48 69 103 67 -36
(68) (15) 20 35 90 55
Taxes (Credit) .... (23) ( 4) 6 12 45 33
(45) (11) 14 23 45 22
Extraordinary
5 4 4 — — —
(40) ( 7) 18 23 45 22
Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Year—end figures taken from
statements certified to by Arthur Young & Company, Certified Public
Accountants
.




LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
(in millions of dollars)
Assets
Current Assets:
Cash and Equivalent 122
Accounts Receivable (U.S. Govt.). 130
Other Accounts Receivable 45
Inventories 343
Current Portion of Future
Tax Benefit 40
Prepaid Expenses 48












Current Portion of Debt 17
Total Current Liabilities 766


















256 ( 2)Plant & Equipment (Net) 258
Future Tax Benefit, Non-
Current Assets 98 49 (49)
Unrecoverable L-1011 Costs 550 502 (48)
















Total Liabilities & Net Worth 1,634 1,573 (61)
*Reclassified to conform with the accounting changes instituted in
the 1975 statements.
Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Year-end figures taken from
statements certified to by Arthur Young & Company, Certified Public
Accountants
.




LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION INVENTORY POSITION




Gross Inventories 437 455 18
Less: Customer Advances 252 251 (1)
Net 185 204 19
Programs other than L—1011
Work in Process 394 483 89
Materials & Spare Parts 81 86 5
Advances to Subcontractors 105 95 (10)
Gross Inventories 580 664 84
Less: Advances &
Progress Payments 422 480 58
Net (Non-L-1011) 158 184 26
Total Inventories . 343 388 45
Deferred L-1011 Tooling &
Production Expenses 550 503 (47)
Source: Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. Year—end figures taken from
statements certified to by Arthur Young & Company, Certified Public
Accountants
.




The need for new financing might not have been so great had it
not been for the monumental production and manufacturing problems
Lockheed experienced during the 1972—1975 time period.
In early 1972 it became apparent that the cost of delivering
the initial airplanes would be greater than anticipated. The Rolls-
Royce receivership resulted in substantial manufacturing disruption of
the L—1011 during 1971 and led to schedule changes and significant
problems in rehiring and training new personnel. After a delay of
approximately eight months, during which production was all but halted,
a program reorganization and renegotiation took place. Lockheed also
began a reevaluation of its L—1011 program costs and cash requirements.
The higher costs were due to a number of unknowns which were
associated with the reopening of such a major assembly line. When the
program was restored, many of Lockheed's former employees could not be
rehired. As a result, an inexperienced work force was employed, with
attendant inefficiency resulting in a higher—than—anticipated level
of training [8] . This and other disrupting effects, including inventory
4
shortages and outr-of—station work, continued to be felt through 1972
and into the early months of 1973.
The L—1011 supply chain was often critical. With over 10,000
items used in the production of the L—1011 TriStar purchased by Lockheed
from suppliers on the basis of open orders rather than on the basis of
orders with a fixed delivery schedule, shortages were very common.
Company response reduced these shortages considerably by mid-year, but




the dependence on these suppliers continued. A strike from June 16,
1972 to September 8, 1972 at a Rolls Royce supplier caused considerable
production and delivery disruptions. Another supplier's problems led
to Lockheed's outright purchase of the company in April 1973.
In order to provide aircraft to airline customers who planned
on deliveries during the summer of 1972 it was necessary for Lockheed
to accelerate production. This increased production rate did not end
as planned in 1972 with the deliveries of the first 12 aircraft, but
continued throughout the year. The rise in production was especially
marked in the last two months of 1972. This effort fell somewhat short
of the expected delivery goal (17 out of 21 aircraft planned) but did
result in increased efficiency. This positive effect was overshadowed
by special "out of station" efforts and system control inadequacies,
with a result that production costs were higher than expected.
A significant effort was made to improve manufacturing opera-
tions during the early part of 1973. Among the efforts made were:
(a) Many installations and functional tests were moved to
earlier positions in the assembly line allowing work
to be completed and tested before subsequent installa-
tion impeded the work.
(b) A new training program aimed at increasing production
efficiency.
(c) Management changes at the L-1011 assembly facility.
The company also responded to a FAA survey of quality control
procedures by instituting many changes during the assembly process.
The cost of these important steps was estimated at $3 million [11]
.
Despite these efforts, costs continued to rise faster than ex-
pected throughout 1973. During the late summer and early fall there
was a disappointing and significant flattening in actual manufacturing
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hours required as compared to learning curve projections. The two
prime reasons for this were
(a) Difficulties of adjusting to the acceleration of the
manufacturing flow.
(b) The inability of manufacturing management to effectively
control the daily work in the fabrication and assembly
shops.
By October, 1973 the situation reached the stage where vigorous action
was again called for. This included organizational restructuring,
adjustments in assembly and flight—line station work—loading and the
replacement, largely through early retirements, of several middle and
senior level managers.
During November and December considerable improvement in
productivity was achieved. With this in mind the company instituted
an "Action Plan" in early 1974 aimed at continually reevaluating pro-
duction methods. The goal was to expend $50 million less than the
company originally forecast for operations during 1974.
Throughout the year this plan was continually revised. With
accelerated deliveries and deferrals a fact of life, a great deal of
flexibility was called for. Despite this changing environment deliv-
eries remained on or ahead of schedule, unit production hours continued
a steady decrease and the quality of the delivered aircraft improved
[12].
The rampant inflation during 1974 was not without its effect
on L-1011 suppliers. Lockheed, along with most other manufacturers,
encountered general price increases and continually lengthened order
lead—time in acquiring some basic materials. These increases were





Again during 1975 the flattened learning curve appeared when
delivery schedules and delays became commonplace [13] . It was clear
by then that market uncertainties, varying demand, and changing produc-
tion rates were raising liavoc with the cost control program. The man-
ufacturing process, having suffered through years of disruptive
influences was now at the mercy of customer needs. This could become
critical in the near future should sales continue their decline as
planning for uncertainty became an important part of the manufacturing
process
.
5. The L-1011 in Service
Some major L-1011 milestones included:
5 April 72 — First delivery to Eastern Airlines (EAL)
14 April 72 — FAA certificate issued
26 April 72 - First L-1011 revenue flight -EAL
30 June 72 — UK—CAA Airplane type certificate issued
The initial report card on the L-1011 was reasonably good. Air-
line and passenger acceptance was generally favorable with no more than
the usual initial difficulties associated with the introduction of any
new aircraft. It received very high marks in reliability and for its
reduced noise levels. Field teams worked feverishly to correct small
nagging problems. 1972 ended on an ominous note when on December 28th
engine problems caused a forced landing of a TriStar and on the following
day an Eastern Airlines L-1011 crashed into a swamp outside Miami,
Florida claiming 101 lives of the 176 on board [11] . With the memory
of the "Electra" crashes still fresh in some officials 1 minds, Lockheed
experts rushed to help federal investigators determine the cause. Flight
crew inattention was the opinion of National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) report issued in June of 1973 [Ref . 50] . Lockheed continued
efforts at correcting the engine problems through 1973. After a second
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engine shutdown, a costly and time consuming engine inspection program
was implemented. This caused schedule conflicts and delays until an
engine fan disc replacement, during the fall, reduced this problem
considerably [12]
.
Steady improvement in "Dispatch Reliability" throughout 1974
gave the Ir-1011 the jumbo jet the lead in "on time" departures. With
"Operational Reliability" exceeding 99 percent in spite of the engine
difficulties, customer reaction was good [30], Unfortunately this
good performance did not turn into sales for Lockheed.
As production and quality control standards increased so did
Ir-1011 field performance. By the end of 1975, 500,000 L-1011 hours
had been accumulated and over 30 million passengers served. The Dispatch
Reliability for 1975 at 98.1% was well above average for the airline
industry [31] . Performance had been more than satisfactory during a
time when sales were less so.
6. Other Lockheed Programs
Major losses on Lockheed's defense programs by early 1971 had
amounted to almost $450 million. These losses were most pronounced on
the C—5A Galaxy, AH-56A Cheyenne, Shipbuilding and the SRAM propulsion
system contracts [8] . Since 1971 the non—commercial products have been
the backbone of Lockheed's financial strength despite the fact that
the L-1011 program has shifted the company's sales toward the commercial
markets. Sales to the U. S. Government averaged 88% of total company
sales from 1968 to 1972, but represented only 74% of the aggregate in
1972. The figures for 1973, 1974 and 1975 were 60%, 62% and 65%
respectively.
The major non-commercial aircraft programs of the early 70 's
included the P—3C and S—3A anti—submarine warfare aircraft, the C—130
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and C—5A aircraft. In addition the C-130 commercial transport and
Jetstar business jet contributed to sales. Shipbuilding, missiles
and spacecraft, and electronic computer systems comprised a major por-
tion of the remaining business [31]
.
With the exception of shipbuilding these programs contributed,
in a positive way, to the company's operations during the 1972—1975
time frame. This is clearly seen upon examination of Exhibit XV.
EXHIBIT XV
LOCKHEED EARNINGS
(in millions of dollars)
1972 1973 1974 1975
Program profits (loss) other than




Interest and other income
Interest costs
Provisions for income taxes
Extraordinary gain
Net Earnings
Net Earnings per share $ 1.43 $ 1.48 $ 2.04 $ 3.86
Source: Lockheed Annual Reports (1972—1975)
7. Scandals
In July 1975 Lockheed officials told the Securities and Exchange
Ccrrmission that Lockheed"could lose lucrative contracts if it was forced
to disclose details of overseas sales arrangements, some of which involved
payments to foreign officials" [Ref. 71]. This aspect of Lockheed's
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foreign sales would be reported almost daily by the news media during
the remainder of 1975 and well into 1976. They were not alone, as sub-
sequent events showed; but, when connected with cost overruns, ship-
building claims and government guarantees, Lockheed became the number
one target of business critics. By August, it became known that at
least $202 million had been funneled into foreign sales agreements with
about $22 million going to foreign government officials and political
organizations. Lockheed officials argued that it could not identify
the beneficiaries without jeopardizing its $1.6 billion backlog in
unfilled foreign orders (military and commercial) . They must be allowed
to continue payments or seriously hinder future sales. They claimed
that such payments are a normal and necessary feature of doing business
in certain parts of the world, are essential to sales and consistent
with practices engaged in by numerous other companies abroad.
The list of interested probers into foreign payoffs became
longer as the months went by. The SEC, Senate Foreign Relations Sub-
committee, Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, House
International Relations Committee, Senate Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations, GAO, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board were all looking into overseas sales and
commissions before the year was out. Foreign payoffs by a large number
of companies were disclosed in investigation after investigation. The
use of "standard foreign business practices" was much greater than any-
one had imagined.
By December, 1975 Lockheed had agreed to disband a special com-
missions fund of approximately $750,000 but continued to deny any alle-
gations of using corporate funds for U. S. political payoffs. They
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stressed that any disclosure of future or past payments could
"significantly impair Lockheed's ability to obtain foreign orders, includ-
ing future foreign orders for the TriStar aircraft that are vital to the
continuity of the TriStar production line" [31] . Further, Lockheed
officials admitted that payments to foreign consultants would continue
to be necessary in obtaining "certain significant foreign orders."
However the Board of Directors had established "stringent policies and
procedures" to prohibit any such payments to foreign government officials,
foreign political organizations and officials of foreign non—government
customers that would not be deductible for U. S. income tax purposes
[31] . This stand did not make the obvious problems for Lockheed go away
nor quiet the unfavorable publicity the payoffs had created.
E. LOCKHEED 1976
1. More Scandals
The Bicentennial year started off much as the previous year had
ended. With foreign payoffs, resignations and disclosures becoming a
daily publicity problem for Lockheed, other difficulties became secondary
considerations. Decisions had to be made concerning who would lead
Lockheed through these difficult times and who would help finance them.
Would the L-1011 bring Lockheed to its knees again? With GAO reports,
FBI probes and Emergency Loan Guarantee Board approvals continuing to
dominate Lockheed's corporate life, would the U. S. Government and
Lockheed continue to walk hand—in—hand?
By February, news editorials were discussing the impacts of
bribes, payoffs and commissions in military and commercial sales.
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was considered one of the most influential
companies in this area. Indeed, by the end of February two of the most
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widely-read weekly news publications had as their cover story Lockheed's
alleged foreign payoffs [Refs. 51 and 52] . Information was also re-
vealed during Senate Subcommittee hearings, bringing further negative
publicity to Lockheed.
Some of the allegations were:
— $7 million had been paid to Yoshio Kodama, a Japanese right
winger, as part of a push to sell six L-1011's for $130
million to Japan's All Nippon Airways.
— $1.1 million were paid to Dutch Prince Bernard in the
early 70's in connection with efforts to sell the L—1011
and military aircraft.
— $2.2 million in payments were made to Italian agents who
passed 85% on to government officials in connection with
Italian government purchases of Lockheed transport A/C.
Other countries said to be involved in payoffs were West Germany,
Colombia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Turkey,
and the Philippines.
By mid-year the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had also become
involved in an investigation of foreign sales. They wanted to know
if the payments gave Lockheed an unfair advantage over other companies
in making foreign military sales. This was especially relevant when
it was revealed that All Nippon had dropped an option to buy ten
DC—10 jets and suddenly ordered six L—1011's [Ref. 53], The controversy
continued throughout the year.
a. SEC Actions
During 1975 the SEC began exainining the documents previously
filed by the 25 top defense contractors. This review, at the request
of Senator William Proxmire, was begun after some earlier disclosures
about foreign business practices of U. S. corporations. Publicly owned
companies are "required to file reports with the SEC regularly and
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whenever there is a significant happening that could affect their finan-
cial status" [Ref. 54] . It was these reports that were being reexamined.
Shortly thereafter there came the admittance by Lockheed officials that
extensive foreign payments had been made (see page 70)
.
The SEC's policy was to require corporations involved in
improper overseas payments to (a) reveal who got these payments and
(b) agree not to make any more. Lockheed resisted. Negotiations between
Lockheed and the SEC on a consent decree, covering the company's payments
abroad, dragged on into 1976. Delayed because of these negotiations
was the annual stockholder's meeting and Phase II and III of the company's
refinancing plan. Finally in April 1976 the SEC filed a complaint in
Federal Court alleging violations of various provisions of federal
securities laws in connection with asserted nondisclosures regarding
foreign payments. It further contended that Lockheed had made payments
many times "without adequate records and controls" [Ref. 55] so one could
not verify the purposes for which the payments were actually made.
Lockheed finally consented, without acknowledging or denying, by signing
an SEC decree on April 9, 1976. No names of foreign officials or
countries involved were mentioned in the consent agreement.
Included as part of the settlement, Lockheed agreed to
correct and amend its annual and other reports on file with the SEC
from 1970 to the date of the decree. Also, a special review committee
composed of outside directors was set up to investigate past payments
and practices.
A high Lockheed official called the consent decree "the
pacing factor" [Ref. 56] governing Lockheed's ability to complete the
details of the recapitalization plan with the company's 24 lending
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banks, issue a proxy statement and schedule an annual meeting. With
this out of the way the long delayed stockholders meeting would be
held in the fall.
2. A New Chairman
By February a significant change came about in Lockheed's manage-
ment. As names of foreign sources were revealed in the payoff scandal,
directors began resigning. Mr. Daniel Haughton, Chairman and A. Carl
A. Kotchian, President, concluded that since they had become the focus
of the controversy over foreign sales commissions, the interests of the
corporation would be best served by their departure [31] . Mr. Haughton
at first attempted to get his own man in as the new Chairman but was
opposed by many of the outside directors, who felt that Lockheed needed
a new face. He finally gave in and Mr. Robert W. Haack was voted
Chairman. Mr. Haughton, who had been Chairman of the Board since 1967
and a director since 1958, would now continue his relationship with
Lockheed only as an advisor.
Although there were changes in at least six different positions,
Mr. Haack 's job would be the most difficult. As interim Chairman,
his planned time frame was expected to be about one year or until he
could get Lockheed to "start refocusing on our corporate problems."
This chore would be an uphill battle all the way.
Robert W. Haack at age 59 was considered one of Lockheed's most
energetic outside directors. A former investment banker and ex—President
of the New York Stock Exchange, he was well connected in Washington and
Wall Street. He had spent the last two years drumming up support for
various Lockheed refinancing schemes. He stated his priorities as
"getting us through our financing problems and some of our Washington
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problems. We have no cash problem at present but we do have a capitali-
zation problem with too much leverage." By August he was claiming that
"the big threat is the L-1011, and you could almost characterize that as
a bookkeeping problem" [Ref . 57]
.
The L-1011 was a marketing problem as well. Although considered
quiet and efficient and having performed to good reviews from various
airline customers, only 162 firm orders had been taken by late September
1976. This compares to an original projection of over 700 when the
L-1011 was introduced eight years earlier. By mid-year Lockheed had only
about three years worth of orders left, which it must produce at a
costly, rock bottom rate of about six planes per year. Projected operat-
ing loss on the L-1011 in 1976 alone was over $100 million. By October
Lockheed had only five new orders for its plane.
Haack's goal was to keep the L-1011 alive for another five years.
If Lockheed could do this, its equity may well grow large enough to
absorb the remaining $250 million in deferred costs. It was now writing
down $500 million of its deferred costs at a rate of $50 million a year,
but, if the plane is forced out of production before 1979, a $350 million
to $475 million write off would be required against an equity of between
$100 million and $250 million. Lockheed would then be without equity [57]
By mid—1976 refinancing appeared again to be a reality. The new
plan differed little from the one agreed on last year and killed by the
foreign payoff revelations. The banks, as originally planned, would con-
vert $50 million in debt owed by Lockheed to preferred stock. This would
boost the company's fragile net worth to $86 million in June, with a
total debt of $800 million. Chairman Haack was also able to persuade the
banks to convert $350 million of the non-guaranteed debt. The switch
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would be frcm 90-day revolving notes to a five-year term loan [Ref . 58]
.
The additional $75 million line of credit arranged for in 1974 could
now be dropped.
It appeared Chairman Haack would lose his first battle for
Lockheed when Canada abruptly pulled out of a $750 million order for
18 P-3 Orion ASW aircraft. But Mr. Haack acted immediately with a new
proposal stretching the production schedule and reducing the outside
financing required. By July, the Canadians had done an about face and
signed the patrol plane agreement [Ref. 59]
.
The refinancing plan, with only minor revisions, was approved
during the first shareholder meeting in two-and-one-half years. This
meeting was unusual in that Lockheed's lenders (who would soon become
reluctant part owners) attended. By the end of the meeting officials
felt confident in Lockheed's ultimate survival. Chairman Haack claimed
that within six to eight months the company would no longer need the
loan guarantees. "There are some banks willing to give up the
guarantees at this moment," said Haack "the majority would like to
wait six to eight months" [Ref. 60]
.
3. The L-1011 Family
Late in 1975 and into 1976 Lockheed officials dicussed the
possibility of another L-1011 derivative to go with the three basic
models then in production (Exhibit X) . A preliminary design for a
L-1011—250 was proposed to its customers. The "Dash 250", as it was
called, was designed to meet the increased range and/or high altitude
airport requirements of certain potential customers. Its introduction
was made dependent upon the receipt of firm orders. Exhibit XVI
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During marketing efforts for the Dash 250 it became evident to
Lockheed planners that the immediate market would require an airplane
designed to provide mediums-capacity, transoceanic jet transport by car-
rying fewer passengers at least 5000 nautical miles. A company task
force, utilizing maximum commonalty of design and manufacturing facili-
ties came up with the answer—the L—1011—500. Comparison of the Dash




No. of Passengers 273 231
Range 4300 n.m. 5300 n.m.
By August, British Airways had converted six firm and three option or-
ders for the L—1011—1 into orders for the L—1011—500 version and added
another three option orders on the same aircraft. The Dash 500 was
assigned production status by September with first delivery scheduled
for sometime in 1979 [10] . No orders for the Dash 250 version were re-
ceived during 1976.
With these new models the L-1011 had branched out considerably
from its basic version first flown in 1971. Lockheed officials now
talked of the L—1011 family tree that would be the basis for operations
into the 1980's. They also hoped to add a smaller, more efficient,
two engine TwinStar when more favorable market conditions obtained.
Exhibit XVTI shows the L-1011 and DC-10 (its nearest competitor) family
trees as of late 1976 [Ref . 61]
.
4. Airline Recovery
By early 1976, the airline industry was showing signs of recovery.
With air traffic levels consistently above year—earlier levels, earnings















The McDonnell Douglas DC- 10 family tree, including











Source: Interavia, January 1977, Vol. XXXII
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trend would continue into the 1980' s. With these encouraging figures,
the typical aerospace view of the wide-body aircraft market reflected
a new, somewhat guarded optimism. Despite very little to show in new
orders during 1976, a market appraisal by one Lockheed official re-
flected the industries' feelings, "the airlines are trying to postpone
new acquisitions for as long as they can—by putting in more seats,
going for higher load factors before increasing frequency and getting
better utilization—if the air transportation market does grow at 7—8%
annually, they will have to buy new equipment" [61] . Revenue-passenger
mile growth averaged 10% during 1976 [Ref . 62]
.
5. Summary
Despite some good news from Chairman Haack the uncertainty
that had existed over Lockheed continued throughout the year. It was
still unclear as to what effect foreign payoff disclosures were having
on Lockheed as a going concern. Some immediate results were:
(a) Claims by the GAO that foreign payments may seriously
inhibit Lockheed's future success in foreign markets
and invalidate its current forecasts.
(b) The possible cancellation by All Nippon Airways of
its order for six L—1011's.
(c) The cancellation by Japan of a $1.2 billion planned
order for Lockheed patrol planes.
(d) Very delicate negotiations with Canada over the patrol
plane purchase.
(e) At least three lawsuits from interested parties asking
for the reimbursement of payoff monies.
(f) The cancellation of two options by Cathay Pacific
Airlines
.
(g) Resignations and indictments in many foreign countries.
Total 1976 earnings and sales were down from the previous year
(see Exhibit XVIII) indicating some softening in Lockheed's profitable
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A. ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE ACT
In considering the issues, it is necessary to keep in mind the
many important events that have taken place since 1971. Some of these
include
:
(a) Major changes in DOD contracting policies.
(b) Complete withdrawal of U. S. troops from Vietnam.
(c) Democratic party election sweeps on three occasions (1971,
1973, and 1975)
.
(d) Watergate and associated political problems.
(e) The Arab oil embargo.
(f) Severe inflation combined with a recession throughout the
U. S. economy.
(g) A financial crisis and U. S. Government aid for New York
City.
The author presents brief discussions on some of the major arguments
against providing assistance to Lockheed. Many of these arguments were
in the form of predictions as to what would happen if the loan guarantee
program was enacted. Some of these predictions were so general in
nature that the author's opinion, based on the research material
gathered, must also be expressed in a very general way. Other arguments
can be answered more directly. Some of the predicted events could still
take place.
1. Political
The guarantee would "prove that Lockheed has the muscle not
only to get the military business it needs but to be bailed out of its




Discussion : J. Ronald Fox in his book Arming America: How the U. S.
Buys Weapons , devotes a full chapter to what he calls "defense market-
ing" [Ref . 63] . An important part of defense marketing is lobbying
pressure on Congressmen. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, having re-
ceived a larger share of defense contract awards than any other single
contractor in seven of the past ten years (1966—1976) , has a great
deal of political power. This was most evident during the hearings,
debates, and final vote on the Fjnergency Loan Guarantee Act.
The aid was necessary because of major problems financing the
L—1011 program. But "civilian misadventures" does not describe the
total situation. Part of their problems stemmed from large amounts
lost earlier on defense contracts, (C—5A, AH—56A, SRAM propulsion
system)
.
Where a large defense contractor locates its plants can be
vital to its success. Major suppliers for large prime contractors
also wield enormous political leverage by being strategically located.
The L—1011 program, although not a defense contract, illustrates this
political power base perfectly.
Lockheed relied on 66 major suppliers spread out over 23 states.
The value of the total L—1011 production program for these suppliers
was estimated at over $1.5 billion. With a Congressman's major concern
being his constituents, many of whom may work for these suppliers, it
would not have been difficult to predict the outcome of many individual
votes on this legislation.
With political influence so important, it is not surprising
when major government contractors strategically locate their plants
and subsidiaries so as to influence the decisions of key congressmen
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(Lockheed and its subsidiaries are located in seven states and ten
countries) . One Pentagon staff member ably described the atmosphere
and how to get around it. A way to ensure key program passage would
be to "place defense plants on wheels and pull them around from one
state to another so that each Congressional district could have equal
tine" [Bef. 63, p. 150],
With programs such as the Lr-1011 it may be even more than
plant location that influences a favorable vote. As one Congressman
succinctly put it, Lockheed's tactics were compared to "an 80—ton
dinosaur who comes to your door and says, 'If you don't feed me, I
will die. ' And what are you going to do with 80 tons of dead, stinking
dinosaur in your yard" [Bef. 64] ? By the end of 1976 there were many
dinosaurs flexing their political muscles.
2. The Aerospace Industry
"The lean guarantee could spell the beginning of the sociali-
zation of the American aircraft and aerospace industry" [5]
.
Discussion : The largest aerospace companies are also among the U.S.'s
largest defense contractors. Being a large defense contractor (Lock-
heed was the largest in 1971) means living with government involvement
in the day—to-day activities of the firm. In 1962 Scherer commented
on the dilemma in the second volume of the Weapons Acquisition Process:
Economic Incentives [Bef. 65]
.
"A substantial degree of Government intervention-socialism if
you like—is inescapable."
The amount of "intervention" had increased greatly by 1971 and is
still greater in 1976.
The role of government in making decisions has been especially
great in government contracting. Safety, equal opportunity, environmental
85

concerns and many social programs are now an integral part of contract
terms. The switch from fixed price (TPP) to cost reimbursement con-
tracts has also stimulated government involvement.
This author equates "socialization" to actual government owner-
ship of the firm or the nationalization of an industry. This has not
taken place. The activities of the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board,
GAQ, SEC, Justice Department, and others are not contributing to a
socialization process in this strict sense. Heavy government involve-
ment will continue to be a fact of life with or without the Emergency
Loan Guarantee Act.
3. Market Discipline
"A broad loan guarantee bill will only encourage a continuation
of those practices that have caused this trouble" [Ref . 2, p. 155] .
Discussion : It is debatable whether the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act
actually encouraged "those practices that have caused this trouble."
Certainly with the threat of bankruptcy somewhat diminished (although
not completely removed) truly efficient operations (conscious or uncon-
scious) will almost always be less likely. Without the market discipline
found in more coirmercially oriented firms, Lockheed and other large
government contractors are less likely to change their old and sometimes
inefficient ways.
4. Contracting
"The government may give Lockheed preferential treatment in con-
tracts after the guarantee went through. This could be in the form of
sweetheart contracts or an easing up of contract administration policies"
[Ref. 6, p. 26409].
"What assurances will there be that the government will not





Discussion ; There is no hard evidence that the government went out of
its way to arrange things, through its contracting policies, so Lock-
heed would survive. As stated in section II, favoritism in this area
would reflect on the government's source selection and contract admin-
istration policies. Other firms would surely be quick to pick up
unfair practices and request redress through bid protest channels.
An indication that the government has not eased up on contract
administration policies is seen in at least three cases:
— The Navy's serious dispute with Lockheed in 1971 over $159
million in shipbuilding claims, which was still in an appeal
status by the end of 1976.
— The loss of $9.8 million by Lockheed on a contract for two
icebreakers for the U. S. Coast Guard.
— No provisions for abnormal escalation in the basic S—3 con-
tract. Lockheed was required to live with this during a
period of very high inflation rates.
Despite this Lockheed did very well in defense contract awards from
fiscal 1971 through 1976.
Lockheed's Position in Defense Contract Awards (1971—1976)
Dollar value % of U. S.
of Contract Annual
Awards Contract
Year Position (billions $) Awards
1971 1st place 1.51 5.08
1972 1st place 1.71 5.11
1973 1st place 1.66 5.3
1974 2nd place 1.46 4.3
1975 1st place 2.08 5.27
1976 2nd place 1.51 3.6
Source: Wall Street Journal
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Major new contract sign-ups during this period included (calendar years)
:
1971 — Trident development funding, Poseidon, Cheyenne development
funding, P-3C, Coast Guard Icebreaker, C-5A modifications.
1972 — Trident development funding, follow on SRAM orders, first
production lot for S-3A, 38 C-130's.
1973 — Trident, Space programs, Propulsion programs, C—130 's,
MA's, P-3C's.
1974 — Trident, Space programs, U. S. Navy submarine tenders, C—130's,
S-3A's, P-3C's.
1975 - Trident, Space programs, C-130's, S-3A's, P-3C's.
1976 - Trident, Space programs, C-130's, S-3A's, P-3C's, Saudia
Arabian air traffic control system, Canadian patrol planes.
Lockheed's profitable defense contracts have certainly helped them
recover from past losses.
5. Bankruptcy
"It is the very threat of bankruptcy which often jolts firms,
large and small, from inefficient practices in their utilization of
labor and capital and in their methods of financing and marketing. This
effect is lost when there is a guarantor of last resort" [Ref . 2, p. 158]
.
Discussion ; The guarantee program, as established in 1971, does not
make the U. S. Government the guarantor of last resort. Lockheed was
still capable of going out of business. The threat of bankruptcy was
lessened a great deal by the guarantees and probably did perpetuate a
sick program (the L—1011) . The close scrutiny during the hearings and
debates (and during the past five years) probably jolted Lockheed from
some less—than-efficient practices as well as a pending bankruptcy
could have.
6. Who Benefits from Loan Guarantees?
"Government guarantees operate to preserve existing interests
in a business and provide windfall benefits to management and stock-




Discussion : The government guarantees do operate to preserve the exist-
ing interests in a business. This is its very basic interest in surviv-
ing. It is most probable that the guarantees did save Lockheed from
bankruptcy.
The idea of "windfall benefits" to stockholders was exaggerated
then and, in retrospect, seems even more exaggerated now. Stock prices
during the 1971—1976 time frame varied as follows:
High Low
1971 15 1/4 - 7 1/2
1972 15 3/8 - 8 3/4
1973 9 3/8 - 2 3/4
1974 5 1/2 - 3 1/4
1975 13 7/8 - 3 3/4
1976 12 1/2 - 6 5/8
Source: Value Line
Dividend payments have not been made since 1969. Certainly
staying in business prevented some major losses for stockholders and
management (who may also be stockholders) but "windfall benefits" have
not yet been attained.
The management situation has been tenuous at best. Although
a case can be made that substantial salaries (up to $150,000-$200,000
range) can be equated to "windfall benefits" other, less desirable
factors have had a mitigating effect. Controversy, resignations, and
indications of severe emotional stress (A company vice president was
found shot to death, an apparent suicide, after the disclosures in mid-
1975) , all indicate less than ideal working conditions. The question
may come down to, where would the manager be had the guarantee program
not come about? Benefits, from this perspective, range from none to
many, depending on the individual involved.
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Thus the real "windfall benefits" probably went to the U. S.
Government (in a contracting sense) and Lockheed's biggest guarantee
boosters, its banks (who stood to lose hundreds of millions of dollars
in a Lockheed bankruptcy)
.
It is doubtful whether monopoly is preferable (from a buyer's
standpoint—the U. S. Government) to artificial competition.
Competition is many times artificially stimulated when large
contracts are offered for bids. Competition has become the watchword
for government procurement during 1976. In DOD's view, healthy
(although somewhat artificial) competition is almost always better than
sole source (monopoly) procurement. Other factors to consider include:
(1) Entry and exit of large prime contractors in the Aerospace
market is very difficult.
(2) Competition can screen out inefficient mismanagement but
may also drive out firms caught in unavoidable difficult
circumstances (ex. TPP in late 60 's).
The Anti-Trust division of the Department of Justice invariably takes
the position that x+1 competitors are always preferable to x. Thus an
opposite viewpoint that "artificial competition" is preferable to
"monopoly" seems to be the standard that most government officials have
adopted. Loan guarantees are certainly one way of achieving this end.
7. Loan Guarantee Controls
"The breath, magnitude and lack of enforceable controls in
this measure make it a financial Tonkin Gulf resolution" [Ref . 2, p. 159]
.
Discussion : Although Lockheed did have problems meeting their original
loan guarantee deadlines, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board closely
controlled the total loan guarantee program. Lockheed had to seek the
Board's approval for any action which could affect its financial position.
The Board's annual report to Congress scrutinized every major aspect
relating to repayment of the loan guarantees.
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The above quote indicates that the spokesman believed the Ad-
ministration was trying to pull something over Congress 1 eyes which
would lead to disastrous follow on aid. This has not been the case.
8. Potential for Government Loss
"There is substantial risk of default and loss to the govern-
ment in the proposed guarantee" [Ref. 2, p. 154].
Discussion : The government adequately protected itself with collateral
in the early stages of the guarantee program. Lockheed assets of $253
million backed the guaranteed loans and the government was given top
priority in any bankruptcy proceedings.
There certainly has been danger points with respect to potential
default by Lockheed. They required $245 million of these loans and an
extension to the repayment deadline. With $100 million still to repay,
as of late December 1976, and more than $253 million in assets still
backing the government position, adequate protection is assured even if
Lockheed should now default.
9. Credit Arrangements
"What interest rates will be charged? Will the terms be adverse
to McDonnell Douglas or to Boeing, which have to go into the money
market without the advantage of guarantees" [7]
.
Discussion : This question points out an interesting facet of the loan
guarantee program. Lockheed was able to receive guaranteed bank borrow-
ings at 8% and 7.3% during 1971. Other borrowings, in subsequent years,
averaged about 3% above the prime lending rate.
If we assume that McDonnell Douglas was able to borrow at the
prime interest rate (which it undoubtably was not able to do) , then
Lockheed paid only 3% more in interest for its borrowings.
Since Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas have similar bond offerings,
a comparison of current market yields over the period 1971 to 1976 can
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be made. High and low price quotes on Lockheed's convertible subordi-
nated debenture 4 1/4' s due in 1992 are as follows:
Price Range 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971
High 49 44 1/4 36 44 1/4 49 3/8 47 7/8
Low 34 1/4 28 1/8 24 1/8 23 1/2 39 3/4 25 1/8
McDonnell Douglas's convertible subordinated debenture 4 3/4 *s
due in 1991 are now compared:
Price Range 1976 1975 1974 1973 1972 1971
High 89 1/2 90 3/8 87 1/2 94 1/2 95 85 1/4
Low 59 5/8 81 79 86 81 1/4 71 5/8
Effective yields on these bonds can now be calculated and com-
pared with the guaranteed notes and prime lending rates
McDonnell
Lockheed Lockheed Douglas
Convertible Guaranteed Convertible Prime
Current Debentures Notes Debentures Rate
Yield (%) High Low High Low High Low High Low
1971 16.9 8.8 8.0 7.3 6.6 5.57 6.25 5.25
1972 10.6 8.6 8.25 6.6 5.8 5.0 5.75 4.75
1973 18.0 9.6 11.15 8.2 5.5 5.0 10.0 6.25
1974 17.6 11.8 13.1 10.3 6.0 5.4 12.0 9.0
1975 15.1 9.6 10.8 9.25 5.8 5.2 10.25 7.0
1976 12.4 8.6 9.4 8.3 7.9 5.3 7.25 6.75
Lockheed's market debt shows significantly higher interest rates
than either McDonnell Douglas or the Lockheed guaranteed notes. Using
the market rate as a fair indication of what Lockheed should be paying
for its debt, a clear government subsidy which discriminates against




"A dangerous precedent it in effect makes the federal govern-
ment a partner in that company" [7]
.
Discussion : The loan guarantee to Lockheed was a precedent. Whether
it was a dangerous precedent is still open for argument. Because of
the environment fostered by the Congress, the news media and the
Emergency Loan Guarantee Board there have been no other requests for
guarantees under this Act. Firms in need have still tried to receive
aid through other means.
Proponents of assistance to New York City used Lockheed as
a precedent. Typical connections were:
"The Federal government has turned its back on the problems
of localities. It's been negligent too long. It's absurd, when
they can bail out the bankrupt railroads, Lockheed and the oil
companies, that they can turn their backs on the straphangers"
[Ref. 66, p. 247]
.
"Don't tell me that an Administration which asks to put $250
million to prevent [Lockheed Aircraft Corporation] from going
bankrupt can be indifferent to the needs of New York City" [Ref. 66,
p. 253].
A direct loan to New York City was made in December 1975. The Lockheed
precedent was an important factor in getting this loan.
The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board tried to go out of existence
in June 1973 saying: "While it is possible that circumstances similar
to the Lockheed situation could arise in the future, such circumstances
are likely to be rare and should be met by a specific request by the
Administration to the Congress for authority tailored to the existing
factual situation rather than by use of any continuing general authority
delegated by the Congress" (Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971) [Ref.
11, p. 11—12] . It is likely that, when the loans guaranteed to Lockheed
are no longer necessary, the Board will again try to dissolve itself.
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Given the new policies of the current Administration this will probably
be successful.
Theoretically another firm can apply for a loan guarantee so
long as the legislation is on the books. Given that this is still a
last resort measure, some interesting events could take place should a
firm be turned down in its application. If the firm should declare
bankruptcy a court suit could ask for redress in the needed guarantees.
The U. S. Government could in fact be held liable by the Courts for the
firm's ultimate demise. This may be another reason for the Board's
eagerness to go out of existence.
11. The Wide-Bodied Jet Market
"There is not enough business for three firms in the wide-bodied
jet field and Lockheed's entry will severely cripple the present dominant
U. S. position" [20].
"If Congress approves the bill it should be prepared to sub-
sidize Lockheed into the indefinite future. There is not sufficient
market demand to support the number of major commercial airframe makers
we have in this country" [Ref. 2, p. 158].
"The airline market would not support both the Lockheed and the
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation" [Ref. 2, p. 161].
"The bill might result in two sick companies instead of one"
[Ref. 2, p. 161].
Discussion : As of late 1976, the argument that "there is not enough
business for three firms in the wide bodied jet field" has certainly
proven true. These three firms are Boeing (747) , McDonnell Douglas
(DC-10) and Lockheed with its L-1011.
The market, as viewed in the late 60 's, was expected to handle
all three manufacturers but, by the early 70 's, these predictions had





Prediction date Source Prediction
September 1963 Lockheed 1400 L-1011's (more than 1/2
sold by 1975)
mid 1971 Lockheed 220 L-1011's by 1977
mid 1971 Lockheed 775 airbuses by 1980
mid 1971 FAA 760 three engine aircraft during
70's
mid 1971 CAB 798 three engine aircraft over
ten year period
July 8, 1971 Unofficial 400 L-1011's
Lockheed
February 1973 Lockheed 350 L-1011's
September 1973 Independent
analysis [Ref.67] 270-310 L-1011's
1973 Bankers Trust 229-318 L-1011's
1973 Bankers Trust 273 L-1011's
July 1975 FAA 300 L-1011's "not unreasonable"
July 1976 Lockheed 300 L-1011's (with delivery
into the late 1980 's)
In July, 1976, the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board concluded
that "while there is no reason to believe that the 300—plane program
is not realistic, the importance of achieving it to maintain future
reported earnings and for other purposes has been lessened by write-
offs of research and development expenses required for accounting
purposes" [Ref . 10, p. 27]
.
The latest Lockheed estimates of the wide bodied market reflects
the expected recovery of airline passenger growth rates.
The market for wide-todied aircraft 1975 1980 1985
Long-range (over 4,000 nmi) 360 600 1,000
^tedium-range (2-4,000 nmi) 230 400 800
Shorts-range (under 2, 000 nmi) 10 50 400
Totals 600 1,050 2,200
Aircraft added: 1976/80=450; 1981/85=1,150; 1976/85-1,600
Note: Figures relate to the number of aircraft worldwide projected
at year end. Source: Interavia 1/77
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When the three major U. S. aircraft producers are compared by-
airliner sales, Lockheed's weak commercial position relative
to Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, is seen. But Lockheed consistently










Note: To October 1, 1976, backlog is estimated from announced delivery
schedules. Source: Interavia 1/77
The dominant U. S. position in commercial aircraft sales has
actually increased since the loan guarantee proposal. When European
and U. S. aircraft sales to European airlines were compared (up through
1974) , the trend toward U. S. manufacturers is made quite clear [Ref . 68]
Aircraft Sales to European Airlines
Delivery
Total sold Sales backlog






















E JR0F EAN AIRC RAF1
1959 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74
Years
Source: Aviation Week, February 16, 1976
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12. The TriStar as an Investment
"Conflicting information on the L-1011 breakeven point indicates
the actual breakeven will probably be much higher than Lockheed projec-
tions" [Ref. 2, p. 154].
"Lockheed is likely to lose as much as $2 billion on the L-1011
program and these losses will only increase if the program is continued"
[20].
Discussion : Both of these statements indicate a lack of confidence in
Lockheed's ability to predict the future of the L—1011 program. In 1971,
Lockheed was projecting a breakeven point of between 255 and 265 L-1011' s.







287 ( 0% opportunity cost)
360 ( 5% opportunity cost)
510 (10% opportunity cost)
1000 (15% opportunity cost)
the 1979-1981 time frame.
As of September 30, 1976, 162 firm and 46 option orders had been
received. Given the 1971 estimate of 255 to 265 aircraft sales neces-
sary to break even, there is still a considerable gap that must be closed.
Some of the problems experienced by Lockheed over the past five years
which have impacted the breakeven point are:
— A slow production rate which impacts the training, learning
curves and supplies.
— Considerable cost increases in the capital, labor and
equipment.
— A continued lack of demand combined with the need to raise




1971 Unofficial Lockheed spokesman
1971 Lockheed auditor
1972 Lockheed




Value Line [Ref. 69] predicted a program p:
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The independent analysis done by Reinhardt [67] in 1973 points
out another serious problem that Lockheed planners apparently failed to
consider in their breakeven predictions. When opportunity costs are
included, significant differences appear in the breakeven point. When
varying production rates are also considered breakeven figures are much
higher.
A 1971 study estimated $800 million in program development
costs on the L—1011. The table below shows potential profit and losses
based on a $14.7 million selling price and a 300 aircraft program (dollars
in millions) [Ref. 3, p. 1161].
Number of aircraft
Amortization of $800 million (cost
per plane)




Profit (loss) plane (18.8) (6.1) ~ 2.7
Total profit (loss) (1.9B) (0.9B) 1.5B
Source: Hearings, Committee of Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs
This early analysis assumed a constant selling price of $14.7 million
along with a constant reduction in the costs associated with aircraft
production.
These assumptions have been found, by this author, to be
unrealistic
.
100 150 300 550
8.0 5.3 2.5 1.5









Opportunity costs consider alternative uses for the money invested
in a particular project. With the Lr-1011 these costs may have been as
high as $1.4 billion and "lost" for over 10 years. Any analysis must
consider this "cost of capital".
This estimate of $800 million is extremely conservative. Various
spokesmen indicated amounts running as high as $1.4 billion. McDonnell
Douglas is said to have spent $1.2 billion in developing the DC-10.
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302 730 811 559 431 2833
426 800 860 653 556 3295
(124) (70) (49) (94) (125) (462)
22 41 51 59 39 212
17 39 41 25 16 138
17.8 18.7 19.8 22.4 26.9 20.5
25.1 20.5 21.0 26.1 34.7 23.8
7.3 1.8 1.2 3.8 7.8 3.4
Simple calculations using TriStar actual sales dollars and the number
of aircraft delivered gives a iDugh estimate of the average price and
cost per Ir-1011 (dollars in millions)
.
TriStar Sales/Price/Cost Information
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 Totals
A. TriStar sales





E. Actual sales (#A/C)
F. Average A/C price
G. Average A/C cost
H. Average (loss)
per A/C
Source: Lockheed Annual Reports (1972-1976)
These figures give a clear indication of the price increases
during the past five years and show large cost increases in the air—
7 .
craft delivered in 1976. Related indices increased over 50% during
this same time frame. The much slower production rate during 1976, which
was expected to continue throughout 1977, also had a major effect.
The final results of the L-lOll program will not be known for
many years to come, but, as of 1976, it is not difficult to update the
earlier predictions.
— Lockheed is likely to lose a great deal on the L-1011 program.
Just how much will be lost depends on future sales and when
Lockheed decides to complete the program. It is not incon-
ceivable that these losses could amount to upwards of $1
billion should sales and production rates continue at present
low levels. When more realistic assumptions of opportunity
costs and slower production rates are considered, breakeven
is beyond even the most optimistic sales projections.
Metal and metal products 119 (1971) - 194 (May 1976) 1967 = 100
Aircraft Industries Average Hourly Earnings $4.17(1970) - $6.20 (1975)
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1976.
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13. Ir-1011 Technical Capabilities
"The Ir-1011 contains serious technical deficiences including
inadequate engine thrust, excessive weight, and questionable design
features for a commercial aircraft" [20]
.
Discussion : This dire prediction by loan opponents has not proven
true. The L-1011 did have technical problems during the introductory
g
phases. The primary early problems were connected with the failure
of engine fan discs on the early EB-211's. Other minor problems were
(1) an engine "surge" or overspeed; (2) development of a high overhaul
rate for the combustion module (hot section) ; and (3) a higher—than—
expected number of accessory drive-gear failures. These difficulties
had been corrected by mid—1974 and the L-lOll has performed well since.
Early introductory problems are common to all new aircraft and this
plane was no exception.
B. SUMMARY
Lockheed has survived and much of the controversy surrounding the
"Lockheed loan" has faded. Although the U. S. Government has not lost
directly, there will always be the question whether or not there has
been some indirect loss. Was there a precedent set which will be
brought up in the future if others need assistance? The answer is not
a simple yes or no. Certainly proponents of the New York City loan
in 1975 used Lockheed as an example of how government has been used to
"bail out" large institutions in financial distress. Although differ-
ing widely in the circumstances, the use of the government to aid
organizations in trouble financially is now considered acceptable by-
many people, when the national interest is at stake.
8See Section III.D.5 for a discussion of the L-1011's performance.
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The Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971 has not been used for
guaranteeing loans to other defense contractors. A combination of
Congressional criticism, government involvement in the day—to-day
operations of the borrower and unfavorable media exposure have all
served to discourage other potential applicants for the benefits of
this legislation. This has not prevented government contractors from
seeking other types of aid when the situation warranted. Government
assistance for defense contractors has continued by way of advance
9payments, progress payments, and lesser amounts of guaranteed loans.
The unique monopsonistic relationship between supplier and buyer of
sophisticated military equipment has not changed.
This thesis looked at Lockheed operations during the 1971—1976
period. The management decision making process, during this time span,
has been fraught with many uncertainties and burdened by poor choices
based on overoptimistic predictions. Selling only 208, $25 million
airplanes, while expected to sell over 700, has been a severe financial
blow. This has manifested itself in a number of ways, and can most
clearly be seen by tracing Lockheed's stock performance over the last
six years. Lack of investor confidence has held Lockheed's common
below $10 for almost the entire time.
Q
The Defense Production Act of 1950 allows the U. S. Government
through various DOD agencies to guarantee loans up to $20 million to
defense contractors. These loans are sometimes called "V-loans".
There were 162 firm orders and 46 option orders as of 30 September
1976.
ihe basic L-1011 price has ranged from $15 million to $30 million
over the past six years. Price differences depend on many factors in-




The L-1011 took six years to go from the drawing board to first
flight (1966-1972)
. Another five years (1972-1977) have passed since
this major milestone. Daring these 11 years, significant changes
have taken place in the market in which the L-1011 was to operate.
Oil embargoes, reduced airline passenger demand, inflation and recession
have all changed the environment for the worse. With huge amounts of
money involved, the competition, although among only a few large pro-
ducers, has been intense. These competitive aspects are expected to
become even more prevalent should foreign producers become more success-
ful in U. S. markets.
As of the end of 1976, 65% of all Lockheed sales were to the U. S.
12
Government. This percentage, having remained almost constant over
the last four years, is a significant change from the way Lockheed
used to do business. Department of Defense contracts alone represented
over 90% of the total company sales during the previous ten years.
Given the problems Lockheed has experienced in selling the L-1011, it is
likely that the U. S. Government may again dominate its future business.
However the coming end of some of its major defense programs will also
have an important impact. The P—3, C—130 and S-3 contracts, although
still with large potential in the foreign sales area, have diminished
importance in future U. S. sales.
Lockheed operates in a high technology-high risk environment. This
environment, although certainly present in defense work, is more perva-
sive in the commercial world. Government business tends to isolate
major defense contractors from some of the hazards of the market place.
12Sales to the U. S. Government include foreign military sales,
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Expanding its share of conmercial products has removed this "shield"
and, thus far, proven unprofitable for Lockheed. This should be an
important consideration in future corporate planning.
Some other uncertainties Lockheed planners 'may have to contend
with could include:
— Another oil embargo. .
— Further restricted use of available energy sources.
— Major fluctuations in the value of the dollar.
— A changing, and potentially less favorable, political environ-
ment.
— Major challenges from foreign producers in the wide-bodied
jet field.
— Changes in government regulation of domestic airlines.
— A less than optimum recovery in airline passenger traffic.
Assuming a more realistic approach to all unforeseen circumstances,
Lockheed management must continue to deal with their biggest uncer-
tainty, past, present, and future—the L-1011 will continue to impact
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To authorize emergency louii guarantees w major business enterprises.
Be it enacted by the Semite and House of Representatives of the
UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled,.
SHORT TITLE
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the "Emergency Loan Guaran-
tee Act".
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOAKD
Sec. 2. There is created an Emergency Loan Guarantee Board
( referred to in this Act as the "Board") composed of the Secretary of
the Treasury, as Chairman, the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Decisions of the Board shall be made by
majority vote.
AUTHOBITY
Sec. 3. The Board, on such terms and conditions as it deems appro-
priate, may guarantee, or make commitments to guarantee, lenders
against loss of principal or interest on loans that meet the requirements
of this Act.
LIMITATIONS AND CONDITIONS
Sec. 4. (a) A guarantee of a loan may be made under this Act
only if
—
(1) the Board finds that (A) the loan is needed to enable
the borrower to continue to furnish goods or services and failure
to meet this need would adversely and seriously affect the economy
of or employment in the Nation or any region thereof, (B) credit
is not otherwise available to the borrower under reasonable terms
or conditions, and (C) the prospective earning power of, the
borrower, together with the character and value of the security
pledged, furnish reasonable assurance that it will be able to repay
the loan within the time fixed, and afford reasonable protection
to the United States ; and
(2) the lender certifies that it would not make the loan without
such guarantee.
(b) Loans guaranteed under this Act shall be payable in not more
than five years, but may be renewable for not more than an additional
three years.
(c)(1) Loans guaranteed under this Act shall bear interest pay-
able to the lending institutions at rates determined by the Board
taking into account the reduction in risk afforded by the loan guaran-
tee and rate9 charged by lending institutions on otherwise comparable
loans.
j(2) The Board shall prescribe and collect a guarantee fee in
fonnection with each loan guaranteed under this Act. Such fee shall
reflect the Government's administrative expense in making the guaran-
tee a*nd the risk assumed by the Government and shall not be less
than an amount which, when added to the amount of interest payable
to the lender of such loan, produces a total charge appropriate for
loan agreements of comparable risk and maturity if supplied by




• J SECURITY FOR LOAN OUARANTEES
Sec. 5. In negotiating a loan guarantee under this Act, the Board
shall make every effort to arrange that the payment of the principal
of and interest on any plan guaranteed shall he secured by sufficient
property of the enterprise to collateralize fully the amount of the
loan guarantee.
REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO LOAN OUARANTEES
Sec. 6. (a) A guarantee agreement made under this Act with respect
to an enterprise shall require that while there is any principal or
interest remaining unpaid on a guaranteed loan to that enterprise the
enterprise may not
—
(1) declare a dividend on its common stock: or
(2) make any payment on its other indebtedness to a lender
whose loan has been guaranteed under this Act.
The Board may waive either or both of the requirements set forth in
this subsection, as specified in the guarantee agreement covering a loan
to any particular enterprise, if it determines that such waiver is not
inconsistent with the reasonable protection of the interests of the
I nited States under the guarantee.
(b) If the Board determines that the inability of an enterprise to
obtain credit without a guarantee under this Act is the result of a
failure on the part of management to exercise reasonable business
prudence in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise, the Board shall
require before guaranteeing any loan to the enterprise that the enter-
prise make such management changes as the Board deems necessary
fo give the enterprise a sound managerial base.
(c) A guarantee of a loan to any enterprise shall not be made under
this Act unless
—
(1) the Board has received an audited financial statement of
the enterprise ; and
(2) the enterprise permits the Board to have the same access
to its books and other documents as the Board would have under
- section 7 in the event the loan is guaranteed.
('«) No payment shall be made or Income due under a guarantee
filtered into under this Act unless the lender has exhausted any retne-
'iies which it may have under the guarantee agreement.
' e )(l) Prior to making any guarantee under this Act, the Board
*nall satisfy itself that the underlying loan agreement on which the




and other protective provisions which are usual and customary in
loan agreements of a similar kind, including previous loan agree-,
ments between the lender and the borrower, and that it cannot be
amended, or any provisions waived, without the Board's prior consent.
(2) On each occasion when the borrower seeks an advance under
the loan agreement, the guarantee authorized by this Act shall be in
force as to the funds advanced only if
—
(A) the lender gives the Board at least ten days' notice in
writing of its intent to provide the borrower with funds pursuant
to the loan agreement
;
(B) the lender certifies to the Board before an advance is made
that, as of the date of the notice provided for in subparagraph (A),
the borrower is not in default under the loan agreement : Provided^
That if a default has occurred the lender shall report the facts and
circumstances relating thereto to the Board and the Board mav
expressly and in writing waive such default in any case where it
determines that, such waiver is not inconsistent with the reasonable
protection of the interests of the United States under the guar-
antee; and
((.') the borrower provides the Board with a plan setting forth
the expenditures for which the advance will be used and the period
during which the expenditures will be made, and, upon the expira-
tion of such periods, reports to the Board any instances in which
amounts advanced have not been expended in accordance with the
plan,
(f) (1) A guarantee agreement made under this Act shall contain a
requirement that as between the Board and the lender, the Board shall
have a priority with respect to, and to the extent of, the lender's inter-
est in any collateral securing the loan and any earlier outstanding
loans. The Board shall take all steps necessary to assure such priority
against any other persons.
(2) As used in paragraph (1) of this subsection, the term "col-
lateral" includes all assets pledged under loan agreements and, if
appropriate in the opinion of the Board, all sums of the borrower on
deposit with the lender and subject to otfset under section 68 of the
Bankruptcy Act.
INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS ; AUTHORITY TO DISAPPROVE CERTAIN
TRANSACTIONS
Sec. 7. (a) The Board is authorized to inspeet and copy all accounts,
books, records, memoranda, correspondence, and other documents of
;vny enterprise which has received financial assistance under this Act
concerning any matter which may bear upon (1) the ability of such
enterprise to repay the loan within the time fixed therefor; (2) the
interests of the United States in the property of such enterprise; and
(3) the assurance that there is reasonable protection to the United
'
States. The Board is authorized to disapprove any transaction of such,
enterprise involving the disposition of its assets which may affect the-
repayment of a loan that has been guaranteed pursuant to the
provisions of this Act.
(b) The General Accounting Office shall make a detailed audit of
all accounts, books, records, and transactions of any borrower with
respect to which an application for a loan guarantee is made under this
Act. The General Accounting Office shall report the results of such





Sec. 8. The maximum obligation of the Board under all out-
standing loans guaranteed by it shall not exceed at any time
$250,000,000.
t
EMERGENCY LOAN GUARANTEE FUND
Sbc.9. (a) There is established in the Treasury an emergency loan
guarantee fund to be administered by the Board. The fund shall
be used for the payment of the expenses of the Board and for the
purpose of fulfilling the Board's obligations under this Act. Moneys
in the fund not needed for current operations may be invested in
direct, obligations of, or obligations that are fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by, the United States or any agency thereof.
(b) The Board shall prescribe and collect a guarantee fee in con-
nection with each loan guaranteed by it under this Act. Sums realized
from such fees shall be deposited m the emergency loan guarantee
fund^ «
(c) Payments required to be made as a consequence of any guar-
antee by the Board shall be made from the emergency loan guarantee
fund. In the event that moneys in the fund are. insufficient to make
such payments, in order to discharge its responsibilities, the Board is
authorized to issue to the Secretary of the Treasury notes or other
obligations in such forms and denominations, bearing such maturities,
and subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the
Board with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. Such notes
or other obligations shall bear interest at a rate determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, taking into consideration the current aver-
age market yield on outstanding marketable obligations of the United
States of comparable maturities during the month preceding the issu-
ance of the notes or other obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury
is authorized and directed to purchase any notes and other obligations
issued hereunder and for that purpose he is authorized to use as a
public debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of any securities
issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, and the pur-
po3es for which securities may he issued under that Act are extended
to include any purchase of such notes and obligations.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS AS FISCAL AGENTS
Sec. 10. Any Federal Reserve bank which is requested to do so shall
act as fiscal agent for the Board. Each such fiscal agent shall be
reimbursed by the Board for all expenses and losses incurred by it in
acting as agent on behalf of the Board.
PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
Sec. 11. (a) The Attorney General shall take such action as may
be appropriate to enforce any right accruing to the United States or
any officer or agency thereof as a result of the issuance of guarantees
under this Act. Any sums recovered pursuant to this section shall be
paid into the emergency lonn guarantee fund.
(b) The Board shall be entitled to recover from the borrower, or
any other person liable therefor, the amount, of any payments made
pursuant to any guarantee agreement entered into under this Act, and
upon making any such payment, the Board shall be subrogated to all




Sec. 12. The Board shall submit to the Congress annually a full
report of its operations under this Act. In addition, the Board shall
submit to the Congress a special report not later than June 30, 1973,
which shall include a full rejjort of the Board's operations together
with its recommendations with respect to the need to continue the
guarantee program beyond the termination date specified in section
13. If the Board recommends that the program should be continued
beyond such termination date, it shall state its recommendations with
respect to the appropriate board, agency, or corporation which should
administer the program.
TERMINATION
Sec. 13. The authority of the Board to enter into any guarantee or
to make any commitment to guarantee under this Act terminates on
December 31, 1973. Such termination does not affect the carrying out
of any contract, guarantee, commitment, or other obligation entered
into pursuant to this Act prior to that date, or the taking of any
action necessary to preserve or protect the interests of the United
States in any amounts advanced or paid out in carrying on operations
under this Act.







This will conhrn. the lollowing basic terms for an agreement between
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Textron Inc. with respect to a pro-
gram for incieasme Lockheed's equity capital and restructuring Lock-
heed's outstandine debt and credit arrangements.
1. Textron Ini fitment. Subject to the conditions of this memorandum,
Textron will purchase for investment (a) 12 million shares of new Lock-
heed common stock at a price of $5 per share, or a total of $60 million,
and (b) 250.000 shares of new Lockheed Preferred Stock (described
below) at a price of $100 per share, or a total of $25 million. The total
Textron investment in new Lockheed shares will be $85 million.
2. Lockheed Rights Offering. Lockheed will sell an additional 3 mil-
lion shares of new Lockheed common stock at a price of $5 per share by
means of a rights offering to Lockheed shareholders. The rights offering
will be registered under the Securities Laws and underwritten by Lazard
Freres & Co. Textron's purchase of any Lockheed shares shall be con-
ditioned upon the execution of an underwriting agreement and effective-
ness of the registration statement for the rights offering.
3. Restructuring Debt. The agreement is subject to restructuring the
present Lockheed bank debt and bank credit arrangements as follows:
(a) The lending banks will convert $275 million of present Lockheed
bank debt into 2,750,000 shares of new Lockheed Preferred Stock
(described below) at $100 per share.
(b) The lending banks will make available to Lockheed credit lines
initially totaling $375 million on terms outlined below.
4. New Lockheed Preferred. The new Lockheed Preferred Stock to
be issued to lending banks and Textron will have the following terms:
(a) Total of 3 million shares, par value $100 a share. Aggregate
par value will be $300 million.
(b) Dividend rate—Cumulative from 1 October 1974 at 5% per
annum, increasing to 6% per annum commencing 1 October 1979 and
to 7% per annum commencing 1 October 1980.
(c) Dividend payment- Cumulative dividends payable on 1 October




(d) Voting One vote per share on all matters, with the right as a
class to elect 25% of Lockheed Directors in case of failure to pay
dividends when due for a period of one year or to meet required sinking
fund payments.
(e) Fixed Sinking Fund—6% of original aggregate par value, plus
redemption premium, payahle on 1 October 1976 and each 1 October
thereafter until fully redeemed. This fixed sinking fund of $18 million,
plus premium, will be applied prorata on the basis of the original pre-
ferred shareholders. The sinking fund redemption price will be $106
per share plus accrued dividends.
(fl Contingent Sinking Fund—An amount equal to 50% of Lock-
heed net income after taxes (at full rate whether or not paid or pay-
able) and preferred dividends, commencing with the calendar year
1975, payable on 1 October 1977 with respect to such net income for
calendar years 1975 and 1976 and on each 1 October thereafter with
respect to net income for the preceding calendar year. The contingent
sinking fund, plus premium, will be applied prorata on the basis of the
original preferred shareholders. The sinking fund price will be $106
per share plus accrued dividends.
(g) Redemption—Redeemable at any time at the option of Lock-
heed, in whole or in part, at $106 per share plus accrued dividends.
5. Locklued Bank Lines. The credit lines to be made available to
Lockheed by the lending banks will be on the following terms:
(a) Initial Amount $375 million.
(bl Interest -4% per annum until 30 September 1976, and there-
after at prime rate plus !/>% . During the period from 1 January 1976
through 30 September 1976, a rate of prime plus V^% will apply to
that portion of borrowings under the lines in excess of amounts set





(c) Commitment fee of Vi% per annum for unused portion of lines.
(d) Secured by the collateral now securing the Lockheed borrowings,
plus a security interest in flight-line commercial aircraft as contem-
plated by the recent $75 million bank credit
(c) Reduction of the lines on the following schedule (in millions) :









6. Payment of Deferred Interest. The deferred interest accrued bv
Lockheed estimated t<> be $(> million on 3(1 Scptemhe i 1971, will be paid
to the banks at closing.
7. Chant;, in I.oeklncd At (ottnting Upon the recapitalization, Lock-
heed's accounting policies will be amended by writing off certain non-
rerun ing costs related to the L 101 1 program. It is estimated that the
write-off under in amended accounting policy, which would be charged
to income in 1974, would aifiount to about $300 million net after pro-
viding for anticipated related tax benefits The accounting treatment will
be subject to concurrence of Lockheed, its auditors, Textron and the
SEC. The projected program lor 300 1.1011 ait planes will not be changed.
8 Lockheed Management. Provisions satisfactory to Textron will be
made for Textron participation in Lockheed management, while main-
taining management continuity.
9. Condition* of Agreement The agreement is subject to each of the
following conditions:
(a) Firm orders for the L-I0I1 will be sufficient to bring the total
program, including airplanes already delivered, to 1 M0 airplanes. The
delivery schedules and prices will be mutually acceptable to Lockheed
and Textron
(b) Release of the L T .S. Government loan guarantee upon terms
mutually acceptable to Lockheed, Textron and the Lockheed banks.
(c) Indications of continued support of the L 101 1 program by
Rolls-Royce, including assurances with respect to funding of production
of the larger engine.
(d) A favorable tax ruling permitting Lockheed to change to a
program basis for tax costing in 1071. and am other required govern-
mental approvals.
fe) Verification of Lockheed financial condition and projections
({) Audit of interim Lockheed Financials |o the extent required bv
Textron.
(g) No material adverse change in Lockheed's business or financial
condition prior to closing. Lockheed's business to he conducted in the
ordinary course, with any transactions outside the ordinary course to
be subject to Textron concurrence.
fh) Definitive agreements with appropriate warranties and regis-
tration rights, and satisfactory arrangements for underwriting the lights
offering to Lockheed shareholder.
(i) Proper corporate 1 approvals including approval by Lockheed's
and Textron's respective Hoards ol Dim tots and shareholders
(j^ Approval bv holders ol two-thuds ol the outstanding Lockheed
Subordinated Debentures to amend i lit Indenture to permit redemption
ol the Lockheed Prelerred Stock and other necessary matters.
(ki Closing bv 30 Noveuibei 1071.
i signed: D. J I l.\i e;ii ion (signed i (J. Will.1am Mii.i.kr







The principal terms of ihc 1971 Credit Agreement
arc amended as follows:
The termination date is extended to December 31,
1977.
Maximum credit remains at $<i50 million, consist-
ing of $400 million Credit Notes and $250 million
Guaranteed Notes. The Credit Note maximum will
be reduced by an amount equal to the amount
ol Credit Notes the banks convert to Series A Pre-
ferred Stock as described under Phase II.
The interest rale on Credit Notes will be 4% pet
annum for a two-year period comment ing April 1,
1975 and prime plus 1% thereafter.
Certain provisions and covenants are modified to
reflect the accounting change for write-off of
development costs, and other necessary matters.
The lei ins of the 1974 Credit and Security Agree-
ment, which subject to certain conditions can provide
up to $75 million of additional credit, are also amended
to extend the termination date to December 31, 1977.
Simultaneously with ihe amendment of the 197!
Credit Agreement, Lockheed issued to its lending
banks ten-year warrants under which the holders mav
pui chase 1.75 million shares of common stock at $7 per
shaie.
PHASE II
Conversion of Bank Debt to Preferred Stock
Following the necessary approvals by Lockheed's
shareholders and debentureholders, the banks would
convert $43 million of outstanding Credit Notes under
the 1971 Cieclit Agreement and $7 million of deferred
interest on bank indebtedness into new Lockheed Series
A Preferred Stock. Upon this conversion, Lockheed
would issue to the banks ten-year warrants for an addi-
tional 1.25 million shares of common stock at $7 pet
share.
Amendment of Credit Agreement
Certain provisions and covenants will be modified to






Exchange of Convertible Preferred Stock
for Convertible Subordinated Debentures
Subsequent lo I lit- ac lions clesc i ibed in the preceding
paragraphs, 1.(m khced ivould offer lo ex< hange shines
of new Sei its It ( onvertihlc Preferred Sioc k for its out-
standing $125 million issue of -I \'.\% Convertible Suhoi -
dinaied Debentures.
Conversion of Additional Bank Debt to Preferred
Stock
Upon consummation of the exchange offer, t he
hanks would convert up to $25 million of additional in-
debtedness for Series A Preferred Stock. If $15 million
oi more (principal amount) ol the debentures are ex-
changed lor Scries 11 (Convertible Preferred Stock, the
conversion would he $25 million of additional loans. If
less than that amount of debentures is exchanged, the
c onv crsion would be on a dollar-lot-dollar basis for the
amount exchanged in excess of $25 million but less than
$ 13 million.
NEW LOCKHEED SERIES A
PREFERRED STOCK
The new Lockheed Series A Preferred Stock, to be
issued lo the lending hanks, will have the following
tei ms:
a. fotal of up to 750,000 shares, $ I par value, liqui-
dation preference $100 pet share. Senior to all
other Preferred Stock on liquidation.
h Dividends, payable semiannually, will he cumula-
tive from dale of issuance at $9.50 per share pet
year, and will be junior, in right of payment, to div-
idends on Series B Convertible ['referred Stock
except in liquidation.
c. Sinking funds:
(1) Fixed sinking fund will commence on May I,
1979 in an annual amount equal to 109? of the
original aggregate liquidation preference.
(2) Contingent sinking fund will commence on
May I. 1979 in an annual amount equal to 10?;
of the prior year's net income (as defined) less
all preferred dividends.
(.'$) Sinking fund redemption puce will he- $I0N
per share.
d. Optional redemption will be provided at $I0H pet
share alter March I, I OHO, pro rata with Series If
e. Holders will have one vote per share on all mat-
ters, with the tight lo elect 20'.? ol the hoard ol
directors if a sinking fund payment oi two




NEW LOCKHEED SERIES B CONVERTIBLE
PREFERRED STOCK
I he principal terms wilh i espec i io pi i» ing of ilit' new
Lockheed Scries B Convertible Preferred Stock, ex-
pected to be offered in exchange hn subordinated de-
bentures, have not yet been detei mined, lei ins (hat
have been determined are as follows:
a. Dividends, payable semiannually, will be cumula-
tive I loin date of issuance and senior, in right ot
payment, to dividends on Series A Preferred Sloe k
except in liquidation.
b. In liquidation will be junioi to Series A Preferred
Stork.
i. Holders will have one vo»e per share on all mai-
lers, with the right to elect two directors it three
dividends .ire passed.
d Sinking tunc! will cnmiuenc e in 1983 in an annual
amount equal to 10% of the aggregate liquidation
preference outstanding on Oc tober I, 1983.
e. Shares will be convertible into Loc kheed common
siock.
f. Optional redemption after Match I. 1980 will be
provided pro rata wilh Series A.
CONDITIONS OF AGREEMENT
The transactions contemplated by Phases II and III
are subject lo the following conditions:
a. Necessary approvals by Lockheed shareholders.
b. Approval by holders of two-thirds of the on island-
ing Lockheed Subordinated Debentures of an
amendment to the Indenture to permit payment
of dividends on, and mandatory and optional
redemption of, the new Series A and Series B
Preferred Sloe k.
c. No event of default under the amended 1971
Credit Agreement and 1**74 Credit ami Securiiv
Agi cement.
In addition, Phase III will require thai a registration
statement for the exchange oiler under the Securities
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